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[Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem] is by no means to be judged as only a negative result,
rather it plays a similar role for proof theory as does the discovery of the irrational numbers
for arithmetic. Bernays (1954b), p. 11
Wittgenstein simply did not know what to say about the paradoxes. I don’t either. But
one thing is clear: the fruitful problem is not to ‘get rid of them’ but to get something out
of them. Kreisel (1958), p. 157
Abstract. This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes
of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the
application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arith-
metic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can
be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented
by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and
Wang (1955) in order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this
method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimano↵’s
paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling-Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into
incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these
results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality
of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth.
§1. Introduction The goal of this paper is to highlight by both mathematical and
historical means the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and
semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. This is by no means a novel theme.
Perhaps most famously, Go¨del (1931b) remarked that the analogy between the proof
of his first incompleteness theorem and the Richard paradox “leaps to the eye”. He then
commented in a footnote that “any epistemological antinomy could be used for a similar
proof of the existence of undecidable propositions” (1931b, p. 149) as well as elaborating
on the analogy between his first incompleteness theorem and the Liar paradox in his
correspondence with Zermelo (Go¨del, 1931a).1
Go¨del’s prediction has been borne out by the work of many subsequent authors who have
obtained formal undecidability results by formalizing a variety of other paradoxes which we
would now classify as “semantic” but which would have been termed “epistemic” according
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 03C62, 03H15, 03C57, 00A30.
Keywords and phrases: Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, interpretability, set
theoretic paradoxes, semantic paradoxes, Hilbert program, David Hilbert, Paul Bernays,
Georg Kreisel, Hao Wang.
1 In addition to the introductory remarks to (Go¨del, 1931a,b), see also (Wang, 1981, pp.
6-8) for further discussion of Go¨del’s engagement with the paradoxes en route to the
incompleteness theorems.
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to the original terminology of Ramsey (1926) employed by Go¨del. An early waypoint here
was Robinson’s (1963) use of Berry’s paradox to prove Tarski’s theorem on the definability
of truth in a manner which anticipates its later use by Vope˘nka (1966), Boolos (1989), and
Kikuchi (1997) to prove incompleteness theorems. More recent applications of a similar
sort include formalizations of the Grelling-Nelson paradox by Cies´lin´ski (2002) and Kripke
(2014), the surprise exam paradox by Kritchman & Raz (2010), and Yablo’s paradox by
Priest (1997b).2
What is less well known is how these results are related to the set theoretic paradoxes
and also how they relate to the line of research which culminated in the two volumes of
Hilbert & Bernays’s Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934; 1939). This work is notable in the
present context for two reasons. First, it contains an extended discussion of the paradoxes,
both as an introduction to and in light of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. Second, the
Grundlagen also contains a formalization of Go¨del’s (1930) completeness theorem for first-
order logic in the form of what has come to be known as the Arithmetized Completeness
Theorem. A simple form of this result states that if a purely relational formula of first-order
logic cannot be refuted from the axioms of the predicate calculus, then it is satisfiable in
an arithmetical model — i.e. one which not only has domain N but is also such that all
of its non-logical symbols are interpreted by first-order arithmetical formulas.
As I will discuss further in §2, Hilbert & Bernays first presented the paradoxes by
treating semantic notions such as truth and denotation as primitives and then showing
how the adoption of natural principles leads to inconsistency relative to an appropriate
background theory. This approach is notable in part due to its similarity to contemporary
axiomatic approaches to truth. But Hilbert & Bernays also suggested that the reasoning of
the Liar provides a template for the proof of the first incompleteness theorem. They then
went on to formulate a second-order truth definition for first-order arithmetic, observed
that this definition can be used to provide a consistency proof for a system similar to PA,
before finally remarking that such a proof cannot be regarded as finitary.
These observations were combined in a novel but largely overlooked way by Georg
Kreisel (1950; 1953) and Hao Wang (1955) who observed it is also possible to formulate
a truth definition for first-order arithmetic in a system S similar to what is now called
Go¨del-Bernays set theory. By applying the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to S,
Kreisel and Wang obtained a first-order arithmetical interpretation of this theory relative
to its formal consistency statement. They then observed that the images under such an
interpretation of paradoxical statements resembling the Liar or the assertion that the
Russell class is not a member of itself are formally undecidable in S.3
After introducing some preliminaries in §3, the goal of §4 below will be to provide
a modern reconstruction and generalization of this method for obtaining formal incom-
pleteness results. Part of the interest of such a project derives from the manner in which
Kreisel and Wang’s work is juxtaposed between the foundational concerns of the 1920s
and 1930s and the subsequent development of mathematical logic from the 1950s onward.4
More generally, I will also suggest that the undecidable statements obtained in the manner
2 See (Kotlarski, 2004) and (Kikuchi & Kurahashi, 2016) for further surveys of results
in this vein.
3 Kreisel (1968, p. 382, note 43) later sketched a proof of Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem based on a related construction. This was subsequently popularized by
Smorynski (1977, §6) and is studied in greater detail by Kikuchi & Tanaka (1994) and
Manevitz & Stavi (1980). The second of these treatments illustrate several complexities
involved with iterating Kreisel’s construction which will not be relevant here until §5.5.
4 Additional motivation for focusing on the results in their original context derives from
the opacity of Kreisel’s original presentation in (1950). For as Wang subsequently
observed, this paper not only contains a number of elisions and at least one apparent
error, it also is “excessively condensed so that the reader would have to reconstruct
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in question are of independent interest. For not only are their formal properties distinct
from those obtained in the manner of Go¨del’s (1931b) original proof or in the manner of
subsequent combinatorial independence results — e.g. in virtue of being  02 rather than
⇧01 or ⇧
0
2 — but they are also generated in a di↵erent manner. For rather than starting
out by replacing putatively paradoxical notions like truth or denotation with surrogates
like provability or demonstrable denotation, the method introduced by Kreisel and Wang
begins with the observation that the relevant semantic notions for first-order languages
are definable in appropriate higher-order extensions.
The independent statements obtained in this manner thus bear a closer resemblance
to the putatively paradoxical ones than do those which figure in Go¨del’s original proof
or in (e.g.) Boolos’s (1989) formalization of Berry’s paradox. As a consequence, the hope
remains that results obtained in the manner of Kreisel and Wang still have something to
teach us about the paradoxes which were used to generate them. Although both authors
hinted at such a possibility, the thought that formal incompleteness might play a role in a
uniform response to the paradoxes has also been largely overlooked by subsequent authors.
I will develop this theme further in §5 in the context of describing how the method in
question is related to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, absolute
undecidability, the intensionality of arithmetization, and axiomatic theories of truth before
o↵ering a brief synthesis in §6.
§2. Historical setting Building on his earlier work in geometry (1899), Hilbert
first employed the method of arithmetical interpretations to logical systems in his 1917–
1918 lectures on the foundations of mathematics (1917–1918). In this setting, such an
interpretation takes the form of an assignment of the numerical values 0 (true) and 1 (false)
to the propositional variables X,Y, Z, . . ., together with the interpretation of disjunction
as multiplication and negation as 1 X. A formula is taken to be valid if it evaluates to 0
under all such interpretations. Hilbert used these definitions to show the consistency and
completeness of his axioms for the propositional calculus.5
In the first edition of Hilbert and Ackermann’s textbook the Grundzu¨ge der Theoretis-
chen Logik (1928) a related technique is described for transforming first-order formulas
into propositional ones, whereby each predicate symbol is associated with a collection of
numerical substitution instances derived by replacing universally quantified formulas with
conjunctions and existentially quantified ones with disjunctions. This yields a method for
constructing counter-models to show the non-validity of formulas falsifiable in a finite
domain by showing how they can be replaced by equi-satisfiable propositional formulas
and invoking the completeness theorem for propositional logic. Go¨del showed in his (1930)
completeness proof for first-order logic how this technique could be extended to formulas
possessing no finite countermodels by proving a form of what we would now recognize as
Herbrand’s Theorem and invoking Ko¨nig’s Infinity Lemma.6
In the second edition of the Grundzu¨ge (1938), Hilbert and Ackermann provide an
exposition of Go¨del’s completeness proof which is then further formalized in §4.2 of
certain steps for himself” (1953, p. 181). In regard to these points, see notes 18, 30,
and 55 below.
5 More precisely, Hilbert originally showed the Post completeness of the propositional
axioms —- i.e. if an underivable formula were to be added to the calculus as a
scheme, the system would be become inconsistent. This was extended in Bernays’s 1918
Habilitationsschrift to show semantic completeness in the familiar form “every valid
formula is provable”. See (Zach, 1999) for further discussion of these developments.
6 See (Dean, 2017) for further discussion of the historical context of Go¨del’s proof and its
reception by Bernays, the introductory notes to (Feferman et al., 1986) for a detailed
reconstruction, and (Dean & Walsh, 2017, §4) for more on the role of Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
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the second volume of the Grundlagen (1939). By this point Hilbert and Bernays had
also elaborated substantially on the role of what they referred to as the method of
arithmetization for the development of the so-called finitary standpoint described in the
first two chapters of the first volume (1934). As I will discuss further in §5.1, one aspect of
their view was that such interpretations may be of use in establishing the consistency of
systems of analysis or set theory for which the existence of models otherwise represents an
“idealizing assumption that properly augments the assumptions formulated in the axioms”
(1934, p. 2/2).
These considerations set the stage for Hilbert and Bernays’s arithmetization of Go¨del’s
completeness theorem in the second volume of the Grundlagen. Unlike modern presenta-
tions, this begins with a careful exposition in §4.1 of Go¨del’s method of the arithmetization
of syntax. This machinery is employed to define a primitive recursive function q(x) for
each first-order formula ' such that q(n) = 0 for all n 2 N if and only if ' is irrefutable
from Hilbert’s axioms for first-order logic. The proof of the completeness theorem given in
§4.2 then proceeds by showing how the arithmetized syntactic definitions can be used to
formalize the steps in Hilbert and Ackermann’s rendition of Go¨del’s proof. This leads to
a method for transforming an irreftutable formula ' of an arbitrary first-order language
into a true arithmetical formula '⇤ by replacing its non-logical symbols by arithmetical
formulas extracted from Go¨del’s construction. The proof thus yields one form of what is
now called the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Let ' be a sentence of the first-order predicate calculus containing pred-
icate letters P1(~x), . . . , Pn(~x) of arities k1, . . . , kn such that q(n) = 0 holds for all n 2 N.
Then there exist formulas P ⇤1 (~x), . . . , P
⇤
n(~x) also of arities k1, . . . , kn over the language
LZ = {0, s,+, x,<} such that N |= '⇤ where N denotes the standard model of arithmetic
and '⇤ denotes the LZ-formula formed by uniformly substituting P ⇤i for Pi in '.7
The presentation of this result marks the point in the Grundlagen at which Hilbert
& Bernays transition from their discussion of Go¨del’s completeness theorem to their
discussion of his incompleteness theorems. Their account of the second incompleteness
theorem in §5.1c famously provides the first full details of the proof at which Go¨del
(1931b) had merely hinted. But Hilbert & Bernays’s treatment of the first theorem in
§5.1b is also notable as it is preceded in §5.1a by an extended discussion of the paradoxes.
This account in turn is informed by earlier discussions in Hilbert’s (1917–1918) lectures
on the foundations of mathematics and the Grundzu¨ge. Collectively, these sources provide
expositions of Russell’s paradox, the Liar, and several paradoxes involving the concept of
denotation.
Hilbert is now thought to have learned of Russell’s paradox soon after its independent
discovery by Zermelo in or around 1899. This marked the beginning of a period during
which the mathematical significance of various paradoxes and antinomies was actively
discussed in Go¨ttingen. During this period, Hilbert and his collaborators also undertook
a careful consideration of Russell’s logicism, the later phases of which are reflected in
(1917–1918). This presentation served as the basis for §IV.4 of the Grundzu¨ge (1928) in
which Russell’s paradox is presented as a variant of the Grelling–Nelson paradox.8
7 This formulation is given on (1939, pp. 252-253/260-263) and has traditionally been
attributed to Bernays. A partial reconstruction of the original proof is given by Kleene
(1952, §72) which is in turn presented in greater detail by Ebbs (2015). Note that the
statement is false if ' is allowed to contain the identity symbol = (for in this case, '
might be satisfiable only in a model of fixed finite size). This restriction may be lifted
if identity is treated non-logically such that occurrences of = may be interpreted by an
arithmetical formula =⇤ defining an equivalence relation on the natural numbers.
8 See (Peckhaus & Kahle, 2002) and (Mancosu, 2003) for discussion of these
developments.
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Although the Grundzu¨ge also contains a discussion of the Liar, this is developed in
greater detail in §5.1a of the second volume of the Grundlagen relative to an arithmetical
background theory which Hilbert & Bernays refer to as Formalism F. This system is not
presented axiomatically but rather asserted to extend what Hilbert & Bernays refer to as
rekursive Zahlentheorie by adding axioms defining a least-number operator µ and defining
equations for primitive recursive functions su cient for carrying out the arithmetization
of syntax as presented in §4.1.9 The paradox is presented as a reductio of the assumption
that there is a predicate W(x) definable in the language LF which provably satisfies the
Tarski biconditionals
(2.1) W(p'q)$ '
for all LF-sentences '. Hilbert’s lectures and the Grundzu¨ge also contain descriptions of
a paradox similar to that of Berry (as first described by Russell, 1908). The Grundlagen
(1939, pp. 262-268/271-277) develops a related paradox, which Hilbert and Bernays liken
to that of Richard (1905) based on the assumption that there exists a definable denotation
function d(x) which provably satisfies
(2.2) d(ptq) = t
for all closed LF-terms t (inclusive of those containing the least number operator).10 I will
return in §5.1 and §5.6 to the comparison of these treatments with latter day interests in
axiomatic approaches to truth.
Although Hilbert & Bernays (1939) ultimately group these paradoxes together as se-
mantische, the reaction which they register to them varies in detail across the sources
we have been considering. What is most important for present purposes is that their
discussion of the Liar in (1939, §5.1a) not only immediately precedes their presentation
of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem in §5.1c but is also employed as a template for its
exposition.11 This begins as follows:
9 Although Hilbert & Bernays’s characterization of “rekursive Zahlentheorie” itself
evolved over the two volumes of the Grundlagen, it is reasonable to assume at this
point in the text that it is a conservative extension by definitions of the system they
call Zµ, which is itself a conservative extension of PA.
10 Hilbert & Bernays denote this function with the symbol e(x) rather than d(x).
Subsequent authors (e.g. Priest, 1997a; Read, 2016) have tended to view the
inconsistency resulting from the assumption that such a function is definable as a
sui generis antinomy – the so-called denotational paradox. But as Hilbert & Bernays
themselves observe, the underlying argument is similar to their prior demonstration
(1934, p. 330/335) that the denotation function for primitive recursive terms cannot
itself be primitive recursive. This goes by a (now) familiar variant of Cantor’s
diagonal method involving the construction of the “anti-diagonal” function a(x) =
subst(pd(x)q, x) + 1 (which Hilbert & Bernays denote by using a two-place function
 (a, n) = 'n(a) where '0(x),'1(x), . . . is assumed to be an enumeration of primitive
recursive definitions). Wang (1955) later showed how this result can be transformed
into an incompleteness theorem by observing that the denotation function for first
order-arithmetical terms (including the µ-operator) can be formalized in second-order
arithmetic and then invoking the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem in the manner
discussed in §4.3 below. The same pattern also arises for the formalization of Berry’s
paradox — i.e. when the denotation function is formalized either by using a provability
predicate (as was carried out by Boolos, 1989) or by the Arithmetized Completeness
Theorem (as was carried out by Vope˘nka, 1966 and Kikuchi et al., 2012), a similar
incompleteness result can be obtained.
11 See (Sieg & Ravaglia, 2005) for a more complete reconstruction of (1939, §5.1-2).
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From the antinomy of the Liar, we are led to Go¨del’s theorems . . . by
considering a modification of that antinomy, and applying the method
of formal sharpening. (1939, pp. 269/278)
In §5.1c Hilbert & Bernays provide a detailed exposition of how the proof of the first in-
completeness theorem can be formalized in F leading in turn to the second incompleteness
theorem. After this they ultimately make the following remark about the significance of
the Liar:
With this demonstration that if F is consistent, the formula C express-
ing the consistency of F is underivable in F, the formalization of the
modified Liar antinomy has reached its full consequence. In fact, this
non-derivability is what the ordinary language rendition of the antinomy
corresponds to in the sharply circumscribed deductive formalism. (1939,
p. 284/294)
This passage provides a precedent for the view which I will suggest in §5 was later
developed in a more direct way by Kreisel and Wang —- i.e. that when the everyday
notions involved in the paradoxes are analyzed formally and then subjected to the method
of arithmetization, the corresponding paradoxical statements are converted into instances
of formal incompleteness, thereby dissolving them as potential threats to the development
of infinitary mathematics.
Another role played by the paradoxes in the work of Hilbert and his collaborators
was as a constraint on the proper development of systems of higher-order logic. In the
second edition of the Grundzu¨ge (1938), for instance, it is suggested that their discussion
of Russell’s paradox shows the untenability of an “undi↵erentiated predicate concept”
(p. 120). And in (1917–1918) and (1928) Hilbert suggests that introducing a hierarchy
of orders of predicates was su cient to ensure that analogs of the Liar and the Richard
paradoxes could not arise.
On the other hand, the mathematical motivation which is given in these sources for
the introduction of higher-order systems is that of formalizing analysis. In (1938) this
is carried out in the system which Hilbert and Ackermann state to be equivalent to the
simple theory of types up to order !. But they also observe in §IV.6 that only second-order
quantification is required to formalize the existence of least upper bounds for definable
sets of real numbers formalized as Dedekind cuts. And in fact a system which we would
now recognize as second-order logic is explicitly introduced in §IV.1 of the Grundzu¨ge to
formalize this construction.12
The importance of second-order logic to our current topic derives not only from its
potential use in axiomatizing analysis, but also from Hilbert & Bernays’s recognition that
second-order languages allow for the formalization of first-order semantic notions. They
first discuss such a possibility in (1939, §5.1a) after remarking that that their axiomatic
presentation of the Liar can be regarded as providing an alternative proof of Tarski’s
Theorem (1935) on the undefinability of truth for formalism F. But at the end of this
section they also remark that it is possible to formalize the definition of truth for LF in
an appropriate higher-order extension of this language.
The possibility of providing a mathematical formalization of the definition of truth for
a mathematical language L1 in an expressively richer language L2 had, of course, been
12 In (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928) this is referred to as the erweiterten Kalku¨l but is
then rechristened as the Pra¨dikatenkalku¨l der zweiten Stufe in (Hilbert & Ackermann,
1938). A version of this system is adjoined to a first-order arithmetic theory to conduct
a more extensive development of analysis in Supplement IV of (Hilbert & Bernays,
1939). These sections are often cited as the origin of the theory now known as second-
order arithmetic (Z2) and as an anticipation of Reverse Mathematics (Simpson, 2009).
See (Dean & Walsh, 2017, §3) for further discussion of these claims.
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foreseen by Go¨del (1931b) and is also alluded to repeatedly by Tarski (1935).13 However,
neither Go¨del nor Tarski produced such a definition explicitly. On the other hand, in (1939,
§5.2e) Hilbert & Bernays not only observed that it su ces to take L2 to be the language
of second-order arithmetic in the case that L1 is a first-order arithmetical language, but
they also explicitly constructed a second-order formula which serves as a truth definition
for LF.
I will return to the details of this definition in §4.3 and to its significance in regard to
the foundational project of the Grundlagen in §5.1. But these developments also served
as the direct antecedent to Kreisel and Wang’s work on the relation of the paradoxes to
the incompleteness phenomena to which we now turn.
§3. Mathematical preliminaries
3.1. Languages and theories The incompleteness results which will be presented
in §4 are most naturally understood in relation to a first-order arithmetical theory Z and a
second-order theory S of sets and classes. The respective roles of these theories is as follows:
1) Z must be su ciently expressive to formalize syntax and su ciently strong to derive a
formalized version of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem; 2) S must be su ciently
strong to interpret Z and su ciently expressive to allow for a natural formalization of the
set theoretic and semantic notions which figure in the paradoxes.14
In their original presentations, Kreisel and Wang took Z to be the system Zµ of Hilbert &
Bernays (1939), corresponding to a conservative extension of first-order Peano arithmetic
[PA] with an axiomatization of the least-number operator. But for present purposes it
will be convenient to assume that Z is a subsystem of PA itself. Recall that this theory is
formulated in the first-order language LZ = {0, s,+,⇥, <} and consists of the base theory
PA  together with the induction schema Ind(⌃n) for ⌃n-formulas for all n 2 N. We will
also have occasion below to consider the fragment I⌃2 consisting of PA  together with
Ind(⌃2).
The status of the theory S is more complicated. Although in his original presentation,
Kreisel (1950) only defined this system implicitly, he later made clear in (1953) that S
can be taken to be a fragment of a form of what is now called Go¨del-Bernays set theory.
Systems answering to this name (and its various cognates) went through several stages
of development which in turn led to distinct axiomatizations. It will thus be useful to be
more precise about the relationship between contemporary presentations of GB and the
more familiar first-order theory ZF.
Recall that ZF is a one-sorted first-order theory formulated in the language LZF contain-
ing the set variables x, y, z, . . . and 2 as its sole non-logical symbol. In his original exposi-
tion, Bernays described a two-sort theory which also contained class variables X,Y, Z, . . .
which had separate set and class membership relations x 2 y and x⌘Y .15 For present
purposes, however, it will be convenient to consider the one-sorted axiomatization given
13 See in particular p. 188 footnote 1, pp. 195–196, and pp. 236–237 in Tarski (1935) and
also footnote † in the English translation (Tarski, 1956).
14 As we will see, S can take the form of either a set theoretic system with class variables
such as GB or an arithmetical system with number class variables such as ACA0.
Although I will follow the contemporary convention of referring to these theories as
“second-order”, it should be kept in mind that both systems are based on predicative
restrictions to the comprehension scheme. As such, it is equally natural to regard them
as two-sorted first-order theories whose models are given by specifying separate first-
and second-sort domains together with a definition of the membership relation 2 which
holds between first- and second-sort objects.
15 Bernays (1937) states that he originally presented a variant of von Nuemann’s earlier
axiomatization of set theory in lectures delivered in 1929-1930 in Go¨ttingen. He also
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by Mendelson (1997, §4.1) which contains only class variables which is in turn similar to
the system presented by Go¨del (1940).
The language of LGB contains 2 as its sole non-logical symbol as well as class variables
X,Y, Z, . . . We define M(x) (i.e. “x is a set”) as 9Y (x 2 Y ) and introduce set quantifiers
8x'(x) and 9x'(x) as abbreviations for 8X(M(X)! '(X)) and 9X(M(X) ^ '(X)). In
order to formulate the axioms of GB, we first introduce the mapping (·)+ : LZF ! LGB
such that '+ results from replacing the set variables x, y, z, . . . with the class variables
X,Y, Z, . . . in ' (renaming as necessary to avoid clashes) and restricts quantifiers byM(·).
Also consider the map (·)  : LGB ! LZF which is defined only for sentences in which all
quantifiers are bound by M(·) and which replaces X,Y, Z, . . . with x, y, z, . . . (renaming
variables as necessary) and removing the relativization.
Equality between classes in GB is axiomatized by
(E1) 8Z(X = Y $ Z 2 X $ Z 2 Y )
(E2) 8X8Y 8Z(X = Y ! (X 2 Z $ Y 2 Z)
GB additionally includes the (·)+ translations of each of the following axioms of ZF: Null
Set, Pairing, Sum Set, Powerset, Infinity. GB also includes the following class existence
axioms corresponding to the so-called Go¨del operations:
(B1) 9X8u8v(hu, vi 2 X $ u 2 v) (2-relation)
(B2) 8X8Y 9Z8u(u 2 Z $ u 2 X ^ u 2 Y ) (intersection)
(B3) 8X9Z8u(u 2 Z $ u 62 X) (complement)
(B4) 8X9Z8u(u 2 Z $ 9v(hu, vi 2 X)) (domain)
(B5) 8X9Z8u8v(hu, vi 2 Z $ u 2 X) (projection)
(B6) 8X9Z8u8v8w(hu, v, wi 2 Z $ hv, w, ui 2 X)
(B7) 8X9Z8u8v8w(hu, v, wi 2 Z $ hu,w, vi 2 X)
Let Fun(X) express that the class X is a class of ordered pairs which is additionally a
function. GB also includes the following version of the axiom of Replacement
(Replacement) 8X(Fun(X)! 8x9y8z(z 2 y $ 9v(hv, zi 2 X ^ v 2 x)))
expressing that the image of a set under a (class) function is a set.
The foregoing principles provide a finite axiomatization of GB. A notable property of
this system is that it is still possible to prove all instances of the comprehension scheme for
so-called predicative formulas — i.e. formulas which may contain bound set variables but
do not contain bound class variables — without using Replacement. This is the content
of what Bernays originally called the Class Theorem (1937, p. 72-77):
Theorem 3.1 Let '(x, Y1, . . . , Ym) be a predicative formula of LGB with free set and
class variables as displayed. Then
GB-Replacement ` 9Z8x(x 2 Z $ '(x, Y1, . . . , Ym))
The Class Theorem may also be used to show that GB proves all instances of the ZF
Separation scheme — i.e.
(Separation) For all '(x, y1, . . . , yn) 2 LZF with free variables displayed,
8u9z8x(x 2 z $ '(x, y1, . . . , yn) ^ x 2 u)
described such a system in a letter to Go¨del dated 3 May 1931 (Feferman et al., 2003,
pp. 105-115) which is then further elaborated in a series of seven papers in the Journal
of Symbolic Logic published between 1937 and 1954 (reprinted in Mu¨ller, 1976). See
(Kanamori, 2009) for more on the history of Bernays’s axiomatization and its relation
to those of Von Neumann (1925) and Go¨del (1940).
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This may be shown either using Replacement or from the following weaker principle which
Bernays referred to as the Subclass axiom
(Subclasses) 8Y 8u9z8x(x 2 z $ (x 2 Y ^ x 2 u))
stating that the intersection of a class and a set is a set.
Define GB  to be the result of replacing the axiom Separation with Subclasses in the
axiomatiziation of GB and ZF  to be ZF without the LZF-replacement scheme (i.e. Zermelo
set theory). It follows from the above that GB and GB  respectively extend ZF and ZF 
in the following sense: for all ' 2 LZF, if ZF ` ', then GB ` '+ and if ZF  ` ', then
GB  ` '+.16 A more substantial result is that this translation in fact yields a conservative
extension in the sense that if ' is in the domain of (·)  and GB ` ', then ZF ` '  and if
GB  ` ', then ZF  ` ' .17
The axiomatization Kreisel originally employed in formulating his incompleteness re-
sults is similar to an extension of GB  with function symbols intended to denote each of the
Go¨del operations. Suppose, for instance, that we let T1, . . . , T7 be Skolem functions for each
of the existentially bound variables in B1, . . . ,B7. Let LS be LS = LGB [ {T1, . . . , T7}, let
BSi be the Skolemization of 1  i  7 using T1, . . . , T7, and let S be the theory consisting
of GB  together with BS1 . . .B
S
7 . A standard argument shows that S is a conservative
extension of ZF . And a simple modification of the proof of the Class Theorem also shows
that for each predicative formula '(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) of LGB, there exists an LS-term
T (Y1, . . . , Yn) such that
(3.1) S ` 8x1, . . . , xn(hx1, . . . , xni 2 T (Y1, . . . , Yn)$ '(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Yn))
In the case where '(x1, . . . , xn) does not contain class parameters, the corresponding LS-
term can thus be thought of as providing a name — which I will refer to as a class term
— for the set defined by the formula.18
It is also natural to ask whether there exists a two-sorted theory of arithmetic which
extends PA with class axioms in the same way in which GB extends the one-sorted theory
ZF. One such theory is the system of second-order arithmetic Z2 formulated over the
16 To see that GB  proves all instances of Separation, consider '(x) 2 LZF and let u be
a set. Since '(x)+ is a predicative formula, the Class Theorem can be used to obtain
a class Z such that GB  ` 8x(x 2 Z $ '(x)). But then the existence of a set z such
that 8x(x 2 z $ '(x) ^ x 2 u) follows from Subclasses. To see that Subclasses follows
from Separation, suppose that Y is a class and x is set. If Y = ;, then Y \ x is a set by
Null Set. Otherwise let a 2 Y and define a class function F from x to x by F (z) = z
if z 2 Y and F (z) = a otherwise. Since this definition is predicative, F exists by the
Class Theorem. But now Y \ x = {u : 9z(F (z) = u) ^ z 2 x} exists by Separation.
17 The analogous result for GB was first shown by Novak (1950) and Mostowski (1950) via
a (now) familiar model expansion argument which relies on a set theoretic formalization
of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem — see, e.g., (Le´vy, 1976, p. 190) for a
concise formulation. Shoenfield (1954) also showed that this result can also be obtained
proof theoretically by using the second-epsilon theorem of (Hilbert & Bernays, 1939).
18 Suppose, for instance, that we introduce the names E =df T1 for the membership
relation, X =df T3(X) for the complementation function, and D(X) =df T4(X) for the
domain function. Then V =df D(E) names the universe, ; =df V names the empty
class, etc. Similar axiomatizations of GB-like systems with (o cial or definitionally
introduced) class terms were common prior to the contemporary adoption of ZF —
e.g., Go¨del (1940), (Shoenfield, 1954), (Bernays & Fraenkel, 1958) and (Vope˘nka &
Ha´jek, 1972). The axiomatization which (Kreisel, 1953, p. 48) ultimately proposed
to formulate his incompleteness results still di↵ers from these in that it omits both
Infinity and principles such as Replacement or Subclasses which are required to obtain
the separation scheme for sets. I will return to discuss the role of these principles with
respect to Kreisel’s (1950) incompleteness result in note 30 below.
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two-sorted language L2Z = LZ [ {2} and containing both number variables x, y, z, . . .
and number class variables X,Y, Z, . . . The system Z2 consists of PA  together with the
induction axiom
(3.2) 8X(0 2 X ^ 8x(x 2 X ! x0 2 X)! 8x(x 2 X))
and the full schema comprehension scheme
(3.3) 9X8x(x 2 X $ '(x))
where '(x) may contain both number and number class variables and parameters (but not
X free). If this scheme is limited to a quantifier class C — e.g. ⇧11 or  11 — then the system
obtained is referred to as C-CA0. And if comprehension is restricted to formulas without
bound number class variables, the resulting system is known as ACA0 (for arithmetical
comprehension). The latter theory can be shown to be conservative over PA and we will
see below that it provides a natural base theory for formalizing the semantic paradoxes.19
3.2. Interpretations Substantial use will also be made below of the notion of an
interpretation of a theory T2 over the language L2 in a theory T1 over the language L1.
Recall that such an interpretation is a mapping (·)i : L2 ! L1 which associates an L1-
formula with each non-logical symbol ↵(~x) of L2 an L1-formula  ↵,i(~x) of appropriate
arity, defining constant symbols via definite descriptions as appropriate. This mapping
is extended to L1 formulas by commuting with propositional connectives and restricting
quantifiers to an L1-formula  i(x) which gives the domain of (·)i. We additionally require
that T1 ` 9x i(x) – i.e. the domain of (·)i is non-empty – and that for all L2-formulas ',
if T2 ` ', then T1 ` 'i – i.e. T2 proves the images of all theorems of T2 under (·)i.20
The most important source of interpretations in the sequel will be the Arithmetized
Completeness Theorem. Another familiar example is the so-called ordinal interpretation
(·)s of the language of arithmetic in that set theory. To formulate this with respect to
LZ and LGB, we assume that the theory of ordinal numbers has been developed in GB
leading to definitions of 0s = ; (i.e. the first ordinal), x +s y (ordinal addition), x ⇥s y
(ordinal multiplication), x <s y (ordinal less than) and ! (the least infinite ordinal). We
may then define (·)s : LZ ! LGB as follows: 0s = ;,  (x)s = x 2 !, (x = y)s = (x = y),
(x + y)s = x +s y, (x ⇥ y)s = x ⇥s y, and (x < y)s = x <s y. It is well known that (·)s
provides an interpretation of PA (and thus also of weaker arithmetical theories) not only
in ZF but also in weaker theories like ZF  and ZF  - Infinity – e.g. (Kaye & Wong, 2007).
By the results summarized above, this extends to GB  and related theories such as S.
There is a related interpretation (·)s2 of Z2 and its subsystems in GB  and thus also
in S. In this case, we must revise our original definition of of interpretation to provide
definitions  1(x) and  2(x) of its number and number class domains. To this end, we may
define  1(x) = x 2 ! as before and  2(X) = X 2 P(!). If we now add the inductive
clauses (x 2 Y )s2 =  1(x) ^  2(Y ) ^ x 2 Y , (8X'(X))s2 = 8X( 2(X) ! '(X)s2), and
(9X'(X))s2 = 9X( 2(X) ^ '(X)s2), then it is straightfoward to see that (·)s2 provides
an interpretation of Z2 in GB .
3.3. The Arithmetized Completeness Theorem Bernays originally proved
the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem in the form given by Theorem 2.1. After this,
19 See (Simpson, 2009) for a canonical formulation of these theories.
20 This is the notion of relative interpretability first explicitly introduced in (Tarski et al.,
1953, §I.1.5). See (Kreisel, 1950, 1952, 1955) and (Feferman, 1960) for contemporaneous
discussions of the origin of this notion in relation to Hilbert and Bernays’s method of
arithmetization and the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. For a more complete
statement of the standard definitions see, e.g., (Ha´jek & Pudla´k, 1998, pp. 148-150).
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a number of generalizations and refinements have been obtained. The first of these was
provided by Kreisel (1950) in the course of presenting the first of the incompleteness results
which I will formulate in §4. Kreisel observed that not only does the irrefutability of a
formula ' in the predicate calculus entail the existence of an arithmetical interpretation
(·)⇤ in which '⇤ is true, but that this fact can be formalized in Hilbert & Bernays’s theory
Zµ using the notion of interpretability.
To state Kreisel’s result in contemporary terms, let ProvT(x) be the canonically defined
provability predicate for a recursively axiomatizable theory T and Con(T) its canonical
consistency statement ¬ProvT(p0 = 1q).
Theorem 3.2 Let T be a recursively axiomatizable theory over the language LT =
{P1, . . . , Pn, f1, . . . , fm, c1, . . . , ck} and let Z extend I⌃2. Then there are  02 LZ-predicates








1, . . . , c
z
q of the appropriate arities such that
(3.4) Z+Con(T) ` ProvT(p'q)! 'z
where 'z is the result of replacing P zi for Pi f
z
i for fi and c
z
i for ci and relativizing
quantifiers with  (x). Moreover, (·)z : LT ! LZ is an interpretation of T in Z+Con(T) –
i.e. for all ' 2 LT, if T ` ', then Z+Con(T) ` 'z.
In Kreisel’s original proof of Theorem 3.2 he constructed the definition of (·)z by showing
how it was possible to directly formalize Hilbert & Bernays’s (1939) original proof of
Theorem 2.1, which in turn follows the method of Go¨del (1930).21 On the other hand,
Feferman (1960, pp. 61-62) later realized that it is also possible to formalize Henkin’s
(1949) more familiar completeness proof in a su ciently strong fragment of PA. It will be
useful to summarize the main steps of this construction so as to illustrate some additional
features of the interpretation (·)k which is obtained.22
We begin by observing that if T is recursively axiomatizable, then it is possible to
obtain a primitive recursive enumeration of all LT-formulas with the free variable x as
'1(x),'(x2), . . . and also an associated countable set of C = {c'0 , c'1 , . . .} of new Henkin
constants. On this basis we define the set of witness axioms for LT
(3.5) HT = {9x'i(x)! 'i(ci) : i 2 N}
A familiar argument shows that T+HT is conservative over T, from which it follows that
if T is consistent, then so is T + HT. We now wish to describe in a manner which can
be expressed in LZ a method for constructing a Henkin-complete extension of T – i.e.
a deductively closed set  T of LHT = LT [ C-sentences extending T such that i) for all
formulas ' of this language, either ' 2  T or ¬' 2  T, ii) if 9x'(x) 2  T, then there is a
constant c 2 C such that '(c) 2  T, and iii) if T is consistent, then  T is consistent.
As I will discuss further in §5.5, there is by no means a unique method for defining  T,
even relative to a fixed recursive presentation of T. For present purposes, however, it will
be convenient to employ the following familiar construction: i) let  0, 1, . . . be a recursive
enumeration of all LHT -sentences; ii) define  0T = T +HT; iii)  i+1T is defined inductively
according to the following extension condition:
(3.6)  i+1T =
⇢
 iT [ { i} if  iT 6` ¬ i
 iT otherwise




T to define a model of T whose domain comprises
the constant symbols C. In so doing we face the familiar problem that since  T will contain
21 The statement appears on p. 266 of (Kreisel, 1950) and the proof is given on pp.
267-273.
22 See, e.g., (Lindstro¨m, 1997, §6.1) for additional details.
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sentences of the form c'i = c'j (for i 6= j), we cannot take the interpretation of c'i to be
this symbol itself. Since we ultimately wish to define a model arithmetically, one means
of circumventing this problem is to extend the Go¨del numbering p·q — which we assume
is already in place for LT – to C. We can then define the function h(pc'iq) = µx.(x =
pc'jq ^ c'i = c'j 2  T) which enumerates the least members of equivalence classes of
Henkin constants up to provable equality in  T.
In the general case, h(x) may not be computable. But it is straightforward to see that it
is possible to construct a LZ-formula  (x) defining the function the Go¨del number of the
xth constant in the range of h(x) relative to the definition of  T given above. The definition
of  i+1T in terms of  
i
T can be formalized by a LZ-formula 8z⌘(x, y, z) (for ⌘(x, y, z) 2  01)
expressing that the formula with Go¨del number x is a member of  yT. We can then obtain
a ⌃02-formula  (x) =df 9y8z⌘(x, y, z) expressing that there is a stage in the construction
such that the formula with Go¨del number x is adjoined to  T. ⌃
0
2-induction hence su ces
to show that the construction of  iT is defined for all i.
Suppose we also introduce the following standard abbreviations for LZ-formulas defining
the following notions: SentLT(x) for formula expressing the set of Go¨del numbers of LT-
sentences, Formv˙LT(x) for the formula expressing the set of Go¨del numbers of LT-formulas
with free variable v, Var(x) for the set of Go¨del numbers of variables, subst(x, y) for the
Go¨del number of the formula formed by substituting the term with Go¨del number y into
the first free variable of the formula with Go¨del number x, ProvFol(x) for provability of
the formula with Go¨del number x in pure first-order logic, Con( (x)) for the consistency
of any finite set of formulas satisfying  (x), and x · y for the code of the sequence formed
by concatenating the codes x and y.
Making use of the familiar “dot” notation of Feferman (1960), we can now record several
facts which collectively formalize that  (x) defines a Henkin-complete extension of T:
Z+Con(T) ` 8x(SentLT(x) ^ ProvT(x)!  (x))(3.7a)
Z+Con(T) ` Con( (x))(3.7b)
Z+Con(T) ` 8x8y((SentLT(x) ^ SentLT(y) ^  (x) ^ ProvFol(x!˙y))!  (y))(3.7c)
Z+Con(T) ` 8x8y(Formy˙LT(x) ^ Var(y) ^  (p9q · y · x)$ 9u9v( (u) = v ^  (subst(x, v))))
(3.7d)
Z+Con(T) ` 8x(SentLT(x)! ( (¬˙x)$ ¬ (x)))(3.7e)
These properties respectively express the fact that  (x) defines a set of formulas which
extends T, is consistent, is closed under deductive consequence, is closed under the Henkin
witness property, and is complete in the sense that it contains the negation of ' just in
case it fails to contain '. It follows from (3.7c,d,e) and the standard interdefinabilties of
the connectives and quantifiers that  (x) satisfies compositional clauses similar to those
appearing in Tarski’s inductive definition of truth (a point to which I will return in §5.5).
Note finally that it follows from (3.7e) that a necessary and su cient condition for the
membership of a formula ' in the set  T defined by  (x) is that ¬' is not a member of
 T. It follows that we could also define  (x) by the ⇧
0
2-formula 8y9z¬⌘(¬˙x, y, z) and thus
that  (x) is in the formula class  02.
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Using the formulas  (x) and  (x) we can now define the interpretation (·)z : LT ! LZ
mentioned in Theorem 3.2:
 (x) = 9u( (u) = x)(3.8a)
R(x1, . . . , xn)
z = 9u1 . . . 9un(x1 =  (u1) ^ . . . ^ xn =  (un)^(3.8b)
 (pR( (u˙1), . . . , (u˙n))q))
(x = c)z = 9u( (u) = x ^  (pc =  (u˙))q)(3.8c)
(f(x1, . . . , xn) = y)
z = 9u1 . . . 9un9un+1(x1 =  (u1)^(3.8d)
. . . xn =  (un) ^  (un+1) = y ^  (pf( (u˙1)), . . . , (u˙n)) =  (u˙n+1)q)
By an external induction using (3.7a–e) it may now be shown that for all LT-formulas
'(x1, . . . , xn) with free variables displayed
Z+Con(T) ` ( (x1) ^ . . . ^  (xn))! ('(x1, . . . , xn))z $(3.9)
(9u1 . . . 9un(x1 =  (u1) ^ . . . ^ xn =  (un) ^  (p'( (u˙1), . . . , (u˙n))q)))
Specializing to the case of sentences we thus have
(3.10) Z+Con(T) ` 'z $  (p'q)
for all ' 2 LT.
The foregoing observations comprise what might be called the syntactic form of the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. This version will be su cient for most of the appli-
cations considered below. However it should also be evident that (3.9) can be understood
as expressing that  (x) defines truth in an arithmetical model of T described by the
interpretation (·)z. This point can be appreciated most vividly when T is a LZ-theory and
the Theorem 3.2 is applied to applied to T itself. For consider a model M1 of T in which
Con(T) is also satisfied – i.e. M1 |= T + Con(T). In this case it is also possible to define
another model M2 |= T relative to M1 such that
(3.11) M1 |=  (p'q) if and only if M2 |= '
by interpreting the non-logical terms of T according to formulas given by (·)k relative to
M1. This can be compared to the standard construction of a model of T from the maxi-
mally consistent set  T defined in the non-formalized version of the Henkin construction.
The foregoing observation can also be generalized by modifying the definition of the
unary predicate  (x) to obtain a binary predicate  (x, y) which defines satisfaction rather
than truth in the following sense.
Definition 3.3 Let Z be an arithmetical theory extending I⌃2, M1 |= Z, and M2 a
structure for the language of a recursively axiomatizable theory T. We say that M2 is
strongly definable in M1 just in case
i) |M1| = |M2|
ii) There is an LZ-formula  (x, y) and such that for all a1, . . . , an 2 |M2| such that '(~x) 2
FormLT , then
M2 |= '(a1, . . . , an) if and only if M1 |=  (p'(x1, . . . , xn)q, ha1, . . . , ani)
where h. . .i is a coding function for finite sequences.
The following semantic form of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can now be
obtained (cf., e.g., Smorynski, 1984):
Theorem 3.4 Let Z ◆ I⌃2 and let T be a recursively axiomatizable LT-theory. Then
if M1 |= Z + Con(T), there is a model M2 |= T which is strongly definable in M1.
Moreover, if T possesses an infinite model, then the interpretation of the equality symbol
given by  (x, y) can be the identity relation on M1.
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In the case where T is itself an LZ-theory, another consequence of strong definability is
the following:
Proposition 3.5 Let T be a recursively axiomatizable LZ-theory extending PA , M1 |=
I⌃2 be such that M1 |= Con(T) and M2 |= T be strongly definable in M1. Then there is
an M1-definable embedding f : |M1|! |M2| onto an initial segment of M2.
Underlying this result is the observation that if M2 is strongly definable in M1 then
there exist LZ-formulas  0(x) and  s(x, y) which define the least element element 0M2
and successor function sM2(x) ofM2 relative toM1. Letting (t)i denote a standard coding
of finite sequences, the graph of the function f(x) can thus be defined by the formula
(3.12)  f (x, y) = 9t(len(t) = x+ 1 ^  0((t)0) ^ 8i < x( s((t)i, (t)i+1)) ^ (t)x = y)
As  f (x, y) is ⌃
0
1 in  0(x) and  s(x, y), it can then be verified by ⌃
0
2-induction that f(x)
preserves sums and products, is one-one and onto an initial segment. It thus follows that
if M2 |= T is strongly definable in M1 then M2 is an end extension of M2.23
Another important consequence of the definability of the embedding f(x) is that it
provides a means of formalizing substitution into the image of a formula under an inter-
pretation obtained from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. Suppose, for instance,
that (·)⇤ : LT ! LZ is an interpretation of an LZ-theory T in Z + Con(T) as above. We
also introduce the symbol f(x) to abbreviate the function defined by  f (x, y) and write
'⇤(x) to denote the result of applying the inductive clauses in the definition of (·)⇤ to
'(x) while treating x as a free variable. '⇤(f(n)) thus expresses that '(x) holds of the nth
element of the model defined by (·)⇤. More generally, the following may now be shown by
external induction on n:
Corollary 3.6 For all LZ-formulas '(x) and n 2 N,
(3.13) Z ` ('(n))⇤ $ '⇤(f(n))
As we will see in the next section, the definability of f(x) is one of several aspects of the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem which allows us to obtain statements which provably
di↵er in truth value between the models M1 and M2 obtained in Theorem 3.5 and which
thereby must be independent of T.
3.4. Arithmetized completeness for GB and related systems Applying
Theorem 2.1 to a finitely axiomatizable LS-theory such as GB or S yields an arith-
metical formula (x 2 y)z which interprets the membership relation relative to Z. By
next applying Theorem 3.4 in the case where M1 is the standard model of arithmetic
N = hN, 0, s,+,⇥, <i we may also obtain a model either of the form M2 = hN, Ei for GB
or of the form M2 = hN, E,B1, . . . , B7i for S where E ✓ N⇥N is the extension of (x 2 y)z
in N and Bi : Nj ! N are interpretations T zi of the Skolem terms Ti corresponding to the
Go¨del operations.
Theorem 3.2 highlights how an arithmetical system such as I⌃2 is a natural theory in
which to formalize this construction. But it is also clear that we could work over any
theory T for which there is an interpretation (·)t : LZ ! LT of I⌃2 in T. In this case,
Theorem 3.2 also provides an interpretation (·)z of T itelf over I⌃2 + Con(T). But since
23 A version of Proposition 3.5 is assumed at one point in Kreisel’s (1950, p. 273) original
incompleteness proof. However it appears to be Wang (1955, p. 36) who first formulated
the definition of f(x) explicitly. See (Smorynski, 1984, p. 41) for references to later
rediscoveries and applications of Proposition 3.5.
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the composition of interpretations is itself an interpretation, ((·)z)t : LT ! LT also provides
an interpretation of T in T+Con(T).24
In the first case we will be interested in below we will have T = S. Since all models of
S are infinite, Theorem 3.4 allows us to obtain an interpretation (·)z : LS ! LZ for which
 z(x) is x = x — i.e. the domain of (·)z is taken to be the set of all natural numbers. Now
define (·)⇤ : LS ! LS to be the result of composing (·)z with the ordinal interpretation
(·)s : LZ ! LS. Note that in this case we will have  ⇤(x) = x 2 !, from which it follows
that all quantifiers in the image '⇤ of an LS-formula ' under the composite interpretation
will be relativized to !.
Note also that (·)⇤ respectively associates an LS-formula  T1(x, y), T2(x1, x2, y), . . . , T7(x, y)
with the terms T1, . . . , T7 denoting the Go¨del operations such that the former are prov-
ably equivalent to arithmetical formulas in S. In the arithmetical case, the analogous
observation allows us to obtain an arithmetical formula defining the embedding function
introduced in Proposition 3.5. This is possible in part because Z proves the statement
8x9t((t)0 = 0 ^ 8i < x((t)i+1 = (t)i + 1) ^ x = (t)x) expressing that every number
is obtained by iterating the successor function and is hence canonically denoted by a
numeral. But although no analogous result about sets is assumed with respect to S, it
is still possible to formalize substitution of class terms under the scope of (·)⇤ in S in a
manner which parallels Corollary 3.6.
Say that a class Y is nameable if there exists some closed class term T such that S proves
Y = T . It is a consequence of the Class Theorem and (3.1) that all predicatively definable
classes are namable. But as the set ClTermLS of closed class terms is clearly countable,
it is also not di cult to construct a formula ⌫(x, Y ) of LS which defines the graph of a
bijection between ! and ClTermLS . Following Myhill (1952) we may, for instance, start
out by assigning a code number to each of the primitive terms T1, . . . , T7 and then define
a function g(x) which enumerates the codes of all class terms in some standard way which
is recursive according to their structure. ⌫(y, Y ) can then be taken to assert that y is a
finite sequence of codes in the range of g(x) which form a formation sequence such that
there is a corresponding finite sequence of classes formed by applying Go¨del operations
in the analogous way whose final element is Y . Note that this naturally corresponds to a
⌃11-formula of LS.
Suppose we now introduce the abbreviation N(y) for the function defined by ⌫(y, Y ).
Myhill considered the axiom
(3.14) 8X9y 2 !(N(y) = X)
asserting that all classes are namable and showed that it is consistent with GB together
with Go¨del’s (1940) Axiom of Constructibility (i.e. V = L). However, what will be of
most use below is his demonstration that over GB, V = L also entails that each non-
empty namable class has a nameable member — i.e.
Theorem 3.7 (Myhill, 1952) GB+ V = L ` 8X(X 6= ; ^ 9y 2 !(N(y) = X)!
9x(x 2 X ^ 9z 2 !(N(z) = x)))
The proof of this result relies on the fact that over GB + V = L it is possible to define
in LS a well-ordering of the constructible sets. Following (Go¨del, 1940, §V), this can then
24 In the case where T is not an LZ-theory Con(T) must here be understood to denote
the interpretation of the canonical LZ consistency statement for T in LT – i.e. what
we would otherwise denote by (Con(T))t. Note also that the identity interpretation (·)i
which translates all symbols of LT as themselves is also clearly an interpretation of T
in T + Con(T). But whereas for this interpretation we have T ` ' $ 'i, we will see
below that this cannot be the case for all ' for the sorts of interpretations obtained
from the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem.
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be used to obtain a predicatively defined choice function As which when applied to a
non-empty class X returns a “designated” set As(X) 2 X. It may be shown that namable
classes are constructible and also that if X is namable, then so is As(X). Thus since As
is definable in terms of the Go¨del operations, it can finally be shown that there is a class
term As denoting As such that
(3.15) S+ V = L ` 8X((X 6= ; ^ 9y 2 !(N(y) = X))! As(X) 2 X)
As we will see in §4.2, while the naming function N(y) is definable in LS, it cannot be
defined by any predicative formula (unless is S is inconsistent). On the other hand, all of the
quantifiers in the formulas  T1(x, y), T2(x1, x2, y), . . . , T7(~x, y) interpreting the Go¨del
operations are relativized to !. Since these formulas are thus predicative, it follows that
S supplies corresponding class terms T ⇤1 , . . . , T
⇤
7 . Now let ClTerm
⇤
LS be the corresponding
set of closed class terms constructed from these class terms as primitives. The previous
definition of ⌫(y, Y ) can now be modified to obtain a predicative formula ⌫⇤(y, Y ) defining
a bijection between ! and ClTerm⇤LS . If we now introduce the abbreviation N
⇤(y) for the
function defined by this formula, N⇤(0),N⇤(1), . . . then provides an enumeration of classes
denoted by the terms in ClTerm⇤LS which in turn corresponds to namable classes in the
model determined by the interpretation (·)⇤.
Now suppose that T 2 ClTermLS and n 2 N are such that S ` N(n) = T (where n is
now understood to abbreviate a term denoting the nth finite ordinal). Note that in this
case we will also have that S ` (N(n) = T )⇤ and thus also S ` N⇤(f(n)) = T ⇤.25 Putting
these observations together, we thus have for all LS-formulas '(x)
(3.16) S ` ('(T ))⇤ $ '⇤(T ⇤)$ '⇤(N⇤(f(n))
This shows that if we restrict attention to namable classes, then we are indeed able to
formalize substitution into the scope of an interpretation of (·)⇤ of S in S + Con(S) in
parallel to (3.13).
§4. Paradoxes and incompleteness The goal of this section will be to illustrate
how the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem provides a tool for transforming a range
of familiar paradoxes into formal incompleteness results. The general method will be as
follows: i) it is first shown how a given “paradoxical notion” may be naturally formalized
as a predicate '(x) in the language of a second-order theory T which interprets Z; ii) it is
then shown that the construction of a statement  '(x) obtained from '(x) in the manner
of one of the original paradoxes (e.g. a Russell-like or Liar-like sentence) does not yield a
contradiction but rather is typically decidable over T; iii) Theorem 3.2 is then invoked to
obtain an arithmetic interpretation (·)⇤ of T which is used to reinterpret the non-logical
terms appearing in  '(x) leading to a statement ( '(x))
⇤ which is provably equivalent to
an LZ-formula over T; iv)  '(x) is finally shown to be undecidable over T relative to an
appropriate consistency assumption.
I will return in §5.2 to discuss both the apparent uniformity of this method and its
bearing on the paradoxes in their original non-arithmetized forms. But before getting un-
derway, it will be useful to first isolate a result which will often be su cient to demonstrate
the undecidability of statements constructed in the manner just described.
4.1. The undecidability lemma Suppose that T interprets I⌃2 and (·)⇤ : LT !
LT is an interpretation of T in T + Con(T) which is obtained in the manner described
25 Here f(x) should be understood as abbreviating the image of the definition of the
embedding f(x) given in §3.3 under the ordinal interpretation whereas T ⇤ abbreviates
the class term obtained by uniformly replacing Ti with T
⇤
i in T .
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in §3.3 from a predicate  (x) describing a Henkin-complete extension of T in LT.26 Note
that in this case  (x) and (·)⇤ will satisfy the following properties for all LT-sentences ',
respectively as a consequence of (3.7a,e) and (3.10):
If T ` ', then T+Con(T) `  (p'q).(4.1a)
T+Con(T) `  (p¬'q)$ ¬ (p'q)(4.1b)
T+Con(T) ` '⇤ $  (p'q)(4.1c)
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that T and  (x) are as above and ' is any LT-sentence such that
T ` '$ ¬ (p'q). Then if T+Con(T) is consistent, then T 6` ' and T 6` ¬'.
Proof. Let ' be such that T ` '$ ¬ (p'q). We now consider the two cases:
i) Suppose that T ` ' and thus also that T ` ¬ (p'q). In virtue of the former
supposition and (4.1a) we also have that T + Con(T) `  (p'q) and thus also T +
Con(T) ` ?.
ii) Suppose that T ` ¬' and thus also that T `  (p'q). In virtue of the former
supposition and (4.1a) we also have that T `  (p¬'q). But then by (4.1b) we have
T+Con(T) ` ¬ (p'q) and thus also T+Con(T) ` ?.
⇤
As a version of the Diagonal Lemma will be available for the sort of theory in question
(either directly or by interpretation), it is possible to directly construct a sentence   
such that T `    $ ¬ (p  q). Since the consistency of T + Con(T) is entailed by the
!-consistency of T (and in fact even by its 1-consistency), Lemma 4.1 already yields a
version of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.27 Now suppose M1 |= T + Con(T).
Then by Theorem 3.4, there is a modelM2 which is strongly defined in aM1. It thus also
follows from (3.11) that M1 |=    if and only if M2 6|=    . It hence follows that M1 and
M2 cannot be elementarily equivalent – i.e. M1 6⌘M2. Taken together with Proposition
3.5, Lemma 4.1 thus also shows that M2 not only must be an end extension of M1, but
it also must additionally be proper. In particular, if M1 is the standard model N , M2
must be nonstandard.
Another consequence of Lemma 4.1 which arises from (4.1c) is the following:
Corollary 4.2 Suppose that T satisfies the same conditions as in Lemma 4.1 and that
' is such that T ` '$ ¬'⇤. Then if T+Con(T) is consistent, then T 6` ' and T 6` ¬'
It follows that any sentence which is provably equivalent to the negation of its interpreta-
tion under (·)⇤ must be independent of T as long as T+Con(T) is consistent. As we will see,
this result is already su cient to convert many paradoxes which are traditionally described
as involving self-reference into formal incompleteness theorems, in some instances without
overt diagonalization.
4.2. Set theoretic paradoxes
26 In the cases where LT does not include LZ,  (x) should be understood in the sequel as
the image of the formula constructed in §3.3 in LZ under an appropriate interpretation.
27 A less general form of Lemma 4.1 is presented in this guise by Smorynski (1977, p.
861) whereas Corollary 4.2 (which will be of more use below) is implicitly employed by
(Wang, 1955).
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4.2.1. Russell’s paradox The Class Theorem can be used to illustrate how the tra-
ditional set theoretic paradoxes are resolved relative to theories such as GB or S which
formally distinguish between sets and classes. For instance, since ⇢(X) = X 62 X is a
predicative formula, GB proves the existence of the class of sets which do not contain
themselves as a member — i.e. GB ` 9Y 8x(x 2 Y $ x 62 x). It thus follows that there
is a term R denoting the Russell class such that S ` 8X(M(X) ! (X 2 R $ X 62 X)).
From this it follows that S `M(R)! (R 2 R$ R 62 R) and hence also S ` ¬M(R). But
then S ` R 62 R — i.e. the “Russell sentence” is refutable in S. Although the language
of GB does not provide a class term by which this fact can be asserted, it still proves
¬9Y (M(Y ) ^ 8x(x 2 Y $ x 62 x)). Thus while both GB and S prove that R exists as a
class, they embody the traditional resolution to Russell’s paradox in the sense that they
refute that it exists as a set.
If we assume the Axiom of Regularity, then it may also be shown formally in S that
no set is a member of itself and thus that R = V .28 Recall, however, that we have seen
in §3.3 that it is also possible to uniformly enumerate the namable classes over S via the
LS-definable function N(x). Although there are only countably many such classes, it is
also possible to formulate a version of Russell’s paradox for namable classes. For consider
the predicate
(4.2) ⇢0(x) = x 2 ! ^ x 62 N(x)
which holds of a finite ordinal just in case it is not a member of the class which it names.
Now suppose that there existed a term R0 2 ClTerm‘LS such that S ` 8X(M(X)! (X 2
R0 $ ⇢0(X))). In this case we would have that S ` N(r0) = R0 for some r0 2 N. But then
S ` M(r0) ! (r0 2 R $ r0 62 N(r0)) and thus also S ` M(r0) ! (r0 2 R0 $ r0 62 R0).
It thus follows that if our assumption held, we would also have S ` M(r0) (since r0 2 !
which is a set by Infinity) and in fact also S ` M(R0) (since R0 would be a subclass of !
and hence a set by either Subclasses or Replacement).
The reductio assumption in this case is thus not that ⇢0(x) determines a set, but rather
that it determines a class. For note that since the definition of N(x) given in §3.4 is
⌃11, the definition of ⇢
0(x) which has been given is not a predicative formula and is thus
not guaranteed to form a class denoted by a term of LS. The argument just given thus
demonstrates that as long as S is consistent, there can be no predicative formula which is
provably equivalent to N(x) over S. In particular, we can conclude that GB does not prove
that the class function denoted by N(x) is itself namable, and also that it is consistent
with GB that it does not exist as a class.29
It is possible to reconstruct Kreisel’s original incompleteness result for a system similar
to S on the basis of a similar series of observations. To this end, let (·)⇤ be an interpre-
tation of S in S + Con(S) obtained in the manner of §3.3 by composing an arithmetical
interpretation (·)z of S in Z + Con(S) with the ordinal interpretation (·)k of Z in S. Now
consider the formula
(4.3) (x) = (x 2 ! ^ f⇤(x) 62⇤ N⇤(f⇤(x)))
Then (x) holds of a natural numbers just in case its image in the model determined by
(·)⇤ fails to fall under the class which it names in the sense of that model. Recall that the
interpretation (·)⇤ restricts all quantifiers by the predicate x 2 ! and note also that the
definition of the function N⇤(x) given in §3.4 is predicative. Thus unlike ⇢0(x), (x) is a
predicative formula of LS.
28 This appears to have been first explicitly noted by Go¨del (1940, p. 10).
29 For more on this point, see (Kruse, 1963) and §5.2.
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From this it follows that for an appropriate class term K,
(4.4) S ` 8x(x 2 K $ (x))
Since K is a fixed member of ClTermLS , there is also a natural number k such that
S ` N(k) = K. But in contradistinction to the situation with the modified Russell class
R0, we have the following:
Proposition 4.3 If S+Con(S) is consistent, then S 6` k 2 K and S 6` k 62 K.
Proof. From (4.4) we have
(4.5) S ` k 2 K $ f⇤(k) 62⇤ N⇤(f⇤(k))
It follows from (3.13) and (3.16) that the righthand side of this biconditional is equivalent
to (k 2 K)⇤. We hence have that
(4.6) S ` k 2 K $ ¬(k 2 K)⇤
And from this it follows from Corollary 4.2 that if S+Con(S) is consistent, then S 6` k 2 K
and S 6` k /2 K. ⇤
Proposition 4.3 represents a partial reconstruction of the original incompleteness result
reported by Kreisel (1950, pp. 273-274).30 Note that the definition of K entails both that
it is a set and also that the biconditional (4.6) holds. But rather than leading to the
conclusion that ⇢(x) does not define a set in the manner of the original paradox or that
⇢0(x) does not define a class in the manner of reformulation with namable classes, the
biconditional (4.6) entails that S leaves undecided whether the number k is a member of
the class which it names. This is our first instance of the pattern described above.
4.2.2. Other set theoretic paradoxes Many familiar set theoretic antinomies are
similar to Russell’s paradox in that they can be derived by asking whether a certain class
is a member of itself. For instance, the paradoxes of Burali-Forti or Mirimano↵ can be
formulated over a theory such as GB (or S) as follows: i) the relevant set theoretic notions
— i.e. ordinal number and well-founded – can be formalized as LS-formulas Ord(X) and
WF (X) which respectively hold of the sets which are ordinals or are well-founded ; ii) as
these formulas are predicative, they determine classes O andW ; iii) under the assumptions
M(O) or M(W ), it can be shown that the self-membership claims O 2 O and W 2 W
would hold in virtue of the fact that O and W satisfy the definitions of ordinality or
well-foundedness; iv) but this can also be shown to contradict the definitions of Ord(X)
and WF (X).
On the other hand, a notable di↵erence between these cases and Russell’s paradox
is that the formulas conventionally chosen for Ord(X) and WF (X) do not instantiate
schema which are inconsistent over pure first order logic.31 In fact, the typical formulations
of the Burali-Forti and Mirimano↵ paradoxes require us to choose particular formulas
defining ordinality or well-foundedness which in turn require the adoption of additional
30 One obstacle to providing an exact reconstruction of Kreisel’s (1950) original result is
that he initially failed to provide an axiomatization of the system for which he intended
it to hold. Although axiomatization of a system similar to S is given in (Kreisel, 1953),
a more serious obstacle is that Kreisel also does not explicitly define the functions f(x)
or N(x) which we have seen are required to refer to objects in the model defined by
(·)⇤. It is thus not clear from his proof why K should correspond to a set in the system
in which he is operating. For more on Kreisel’s original proof, see note 55 below.
31 Recall in particular that the instance of Comprehension required to derive Russell’s
paradox has the form 9x8y('(x, y)$ ¬'(y, y)) (taking x 2 y for '(x, y)), all instances
of which are refutable in first-order logic.
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set theoretic axioms in order to derive the relevant contradictions.32 As a consequence, it
is less straightforward to transform these paradoxes directly into incompleteness results.
A case of intermediate complexity is provided by Quine’s (1981, p. 130) paradox of
reciprocated classes. Consider the family of predicates  0(x) = x 62 x and for n > 0
(4.7)  n(x) = ¬9y1 . . . yn(x 2 y1 ^ y1 2 y2 ^ . . . ^ yn 1 2 yn ^ yn 2 x)
For each n,  n(x) holds of those sets x which do not contain an 2-cycle of length n. As
 i(x) is predicative, S proves the existence of the class Ui determined by each predicate
 i(x). But it is also easy to see that S proves U0 = R and thus also ¬M(U0). The fact
that S ` ¬M(Ui) for i   1 illustrates the general pattern of reasoning required to formally
derive ¬M(O) or ¬M(W ).33 By way of example, consider the case for n = 1 and assume
for reductio that M(U1). From this it follows that
(4.8) U1 2 U1 $ ¬9y(U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1)
Reasoning in S, we may now proceed as follows:
i) Suppose U1 2 U1.
ii) Then ¬9y(U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1) by (4.8).
iii) From i) we have U1 2 U1 ^ U1 2 U1. But by generalizing we obtain 9y(U1 2 y ^ y 2
U1) contradicting ii).
iv) Suppose U1 62 U1.
v) Then 9y(U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1) by (4.8).
vi) If we fix y such that U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1 it then follows that 9z(z 2 y ^ y 2 z).
vii) Since y 2 U1, ¬9z(z 2 y ^ y 2 z) by (4.8) again. But this contradicts vi).
Since S ` U1 2 U1 _ U1 62 U1, i)–vii) comprise a derivation of ¬M(U1) in S.
As an intermediate step in developing an arithmetized version of this paradox, note
that it is again possible to formulate a version of this reasoning for the namable classes
analogous to the second version of the Russell antinomy presented above. Consider in
particular the predicate
(4.9)  01(x) = x 2 ! ^ ¬9y(x 2 N(y) ^ y 2 N(x))
which is obtained from  1(x) in the same manner by which ⇢
0(x) is obtained from ⇢(x)
above. If we were to assume for reductio that  01(x) determines a class U
0
1, then it would
follow that there exists a natural number u01 2 N such S ` N(u01) = U 02 for an appropriate
class term U 01. Thus since S ` U 01 ✓ !, we would again have M(U 01) by Subclasses. But as
in the case of ⇢0(x) it is easy to see that a contradiction can be reached by mimicking the
reasoning of the argument i)–vii).
In order to obtain an incompleteness result analogous to Proposition 4.3, we now wish
to replicate the forgoing reasoning under the scope of an interpretation obtained from
the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. But we will see that this requires that we are
32 See (Doets, 1999) for a discussion of the additional principles which are required in
these cases.
33 In fact the paradox of reciprocated classes can be understood as a simplification of
Montague’s (1955) paradox of grounded classes which in turn can be understood as a
simplification of Mirimano↵ paradoxes which avoids the need to formalize the notion
of finitude. Montague’s version arises when we consider the class of all grounded sets
satisfying the predicate ↵(x) = 8u(x 2 u ! 9y(y 2 u ^ ¬9z(z 2 u ^ z 2 y)) which
holds of x just in case all sets u containing x have the property which is asserted to
hold of all sets by the Axiom of Regularity — i.e. if u is non-empty, then it contains
a y such that y \ u = ;. A similar incompleteness result can be obtained via a more
involved version of the argument illustrated by Proposition 4.4 below.
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able to show that there is a term witnessing the existential quantifier in the statement
9y(U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1) appearing in the original proof. In light of this, we will work over
S+ = S + V = L and consider an interpretation (·)⇤ of S+ in S+ + Con(S+) obtained as
in §4.2. Next consider the predicate
(4.10)  1(x) = x 2 ! ^ ¬9y(f(x) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(x)))
which is obtained from  02(x) in the same manner that (x) is obtained from ⇢
0(x) in the
proof of Proposition 4.3. As  1(x) is predicative, it follows that there is a class term B1
such that S ` 8x(x 2 B2 $  1(x)) and b1 2 ! such that S ` N(b1) = B1. We can now
formulate the following:
Proposition 4.4 Suppose S+ +Con(S+) is consistent. Then S 6` b1 2 B1 and S 6` b1 62
B1.
Proof. As in the case of Proposition 4.3, S+ ` B1 ✓ ! and thus S+ ` M(B1). Applying
definition (4.10), we obtain
(4.11) S+ ` b1 2 B1 $ ¬9y(f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1)))
Now suppose that S+ ` b1 2 B1 and thus also S+ + Con(S+) ` (b1 2 B1)⇤. But then
S++Con(S+) ` f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1)). But then trivially S++Con(S+) ` f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1)) ^
f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1)). Generalizing we thus get S+ ` 9y(f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1)))
which is in turn equivalent to S+ ` ¬(b1 2 B1)⇤. But this entails that S+ +Con(S+) ` ?.
On the other hand suppose that S+ ` b1 62 B1. In this case, S+ ` 9y(f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^
f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1))). But now consider the formula  (y) = f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤
N⇤(f(b1)). As  (x) is predicative, there is some class term T such that S+ ` 8x( (x) $
x 2 T ) ^ T 6= ;. But since such a class is nameable, it follows by Theorem 3.7 that
S+ ` As(T ) 2 T . From this it follows that
(4.12) S+ ` f(b1) 2⇤ N⇤(f(As(T ))) ^ f(As(T )) 2⇤ N⇤(f(b1))
From the second conjunct we obtain S+ ` (As(T ) 2 B1)⇤ which is in turn equivalent
to S+ ` ( 1(As(T )))⇤. But now note that by permuting the conjuncts of (4.12) and
generalizing we also have
(4.13) S+ ` 9y(f(As(T )) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(As(T ))))
But then also
(4.14) S+ +Con(S) ` (9y(f(As(T )) 2⇤ N⇤(f(y)) ^ f(y) 2⇤ N⇤(f(As(T )))))⇤
But this is equivalent to S+ + Con(S) ` (¬ 1(As(T )))⇤. We thus again conclude that
S+ +Con(S+) ` ?.34 ⇤
34 Note that the need to work over S + V = L rather than S arises here because the
reasoning embodied by steps iv)–vii) of the original paradox requires us to expand
the definition of U1 twice — the first time to conclude that there is some y such that
U1 2 y ^ y 2 U1 and the second to conclude that y is such that 9z(z 2 y ^ y 2 z). (This
is also a feature of several other set theoretic paradoxes — inclusive of those of Burali-
Forti and Mimirano↵—which appears to distinguish them from that of Russell.) When
formalizing the sort of reasoning at issue in the arithmetized setting, we are thus faced
with the need to refer to classes defined relative to two iterations of the interpretation
(·)⇤. As the proof of Proposition 4.4 illustrates, one means of ensuring that we are
able to keep track of classes across the models which are defined by (·)⇤ is to adopt an
assumption such as V = L which is su cient to ensure that they are denoted by terms.
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4.3. Semantic paradoxes As I will return to discuss in §5.2, the second version
of Russell’s paradox illustrates a moral about predicative definability which in turn can be
understood to relate directly to the semantic paradoxes. It was, however, via a di↵erent
route by which Kreisel (1953, p. 47) first hinted at the possibility of using a truth definition
for arithmetic to obtain an incompleteness result in a manner similar to Proposition
4.3. Such a construction was first carried out by Wang (1955). But at this time the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem had only been stated in the form of Theorem 3.2 and
not in the form of Theorem 3.4. For whereas the proof of the former result sketched above
constructs the interpretation (·)z from  (x) via (3.8), the original proof given by Hilbert
& Bernays (1939, §4.2) from which Wang worked constructed the predicates defining the
non-logical terms of LT one at a time in the manner of Go¨del’s original completeness
proof.35
Wang’s approach to the paradoxes may thus be understood as a direct continuation
of the strategy initiated by Hilbert & Bernays in the Grundlagen. In particular, he
first adapted the truth definition Tr(x) for LZ in L2Z which Hilbert and Bernays had
given in (1939, §5.2e) to a set theoretic system similar to S. He then employed Theorem
3.2 to obtain an interpretation (·)⇤ of S in S + Con(S) in the same manner as Kreisel
(1950). In this way he obtained an interpretation Tr⇤(x) of the truth predicate in the
arithmetical fragment of LS. Wang then went on to observe that when the primitive truth
predicate W(x) which Hilbert & Bernays had employed in their axiomatic treatment of
the paradoxes in §5.1a is replaced with Tr⇤(x), the Liar-like sentence constructed in the
same manner becomes undecidable in S. This result can thus be understood to further
bear out Hilbert & Bernays’s prediction in (1939, §5.1c) that when the concepts involved
in formulating the Liar are formalized mathematically, the paradox is transformed into a
formal incompleteness result.
4.3.1. A second-order truth definition In order to reconstruct and generalize this
method, it will be useful to work not over S but rather a theory of second-order arithmetic
which is closer to that over which Hilbert & Bernays formulated their original truth
definition. Many of the observations which are required to carry out this task pertain to
the expressibility of the truth definition in L2Z rather than the ability of a given theory to
prove that the corresponding set of true LZ-sentences exists. There is thus some flexibility
in the choice of subsystems of Z2 which may be used to carry out the formalization.
However the theory ACA0 suggests itself not only because it conservatively extends PA in
the same manner as GB extends ZF, but also because it is similar to the system in which
Hilbert & Bernays proposed to formalize analysis in Supplement IV of (1939).
Turning to the task of formulating the truth definition, recall first that already in LZ we
can define an evaluation function val(x) for closed LZ-terms such that ACA0 ` val(ptq) = t.
Also let ClTermLZ(x) formalize that x is the Go¨del number of a closed term of LZ and
⌃0y˙-SentLZ(x) and ⇧
0
y˙-SentLZ(x) respectively formalize that x is the Go¨del number of a
⌃0y- or ⇧
0
y-formula of LZ (where y is understood as a free variable). We may now construct
an L2Z-formula ⌧(y,X) which expresses that the number class X is a truth definition for
⌃0y [⇧0y-sentences of LZ as follows:36
35 Recall that if T and  (x) are as in §3.3, then  (x) can be understood as providing a
truth definition for a model M2 which is strongly definable in M1 |= T+Con(T) while
on the other hand (·)z only directly provides an interpretation of the atomic formulas
of LT. Thus while Theorem 3.4 can be understood as providing a characterization of
the elementary diagram of M1, Theorem 3.2 only directly provides a characterization
of its atomic diagram.
36 Here expressions such as x · p=q · y are used to abbreviate the Go¨del number of the
sentence formed by concatenating the term Go¨del numbered by x with the Go¨del
number of the equality sign and the term Go¨del numbered by y. A similar truth
definition is presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939, p. 333-334/347). This may be
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⌧(y,X) =df 8z((z 2 X ! ⌃0y˙-SentLZ(z) _ ⇧0y˙-SentLZ(z)) ^
8x8y(ClTermLZ(x) ^ ClTermLZ(y)! (x · p=q · y 2 X $ val(x) = val(y))) ^
8x8y(⌃0y˙ 1-SentLZ(x) ^ ⌃0y˙-SentLZ(y)! (x · p^ q · y 2 X $ x 2 X ^ y 2 X)) ^
8x(⌃0y˙-SentLZ(x)! (p¬q · x 2 X $ x 62 X)) ^
8x8z(Var(z) ^ ⌃0y˙ 1-SentLZ(p8q · z · x) ^ p8q · z · x 2 X $ 8v(subst(x, v) 2 X)) ^
8x8z(Var(z) ^ ⇧0y˙ 1-SentLZ(p9q · z · x) ^ p9q · z · x 2 X $ 9v(subst(x, v) 2 X)))
We can now specify a ⌃11-formula of L2Z which uniformly defines truth for LZ-sentences as
follows:
(4.15) Tr(x) =df 9X9y(⌧(y,X) ^ x 2 X)
By an external induction on the complexity of formulas, it may now be shown that Tr(x)
satisfies Tarski’s Convention T in the sense that for all LZ-sentences '
(4.16) ACA0 ` Tr(p'q)$ '
This definition may additionally be shown to satisfy the standard Tarskian compositional
clauses — i.e. for all LZ-sentences ', 
Tr(p' ^  q)$ Tr(p'q) ^ Tr(p q)(4.17a)
Tr(p¬'q)$ ¬Tr(p'q)(4.17b)
Tr(p8x'(x)q)$ 8xTr(subst(p'(v)q, x))(4.17c)
are provable in ACA0.
These observations suggest both that the language L2Z is su ciently expressive to
provide a natural formalization of first-order arithmetical truth and that the theory ACA0
is su cient to show that it demonstrates at least some of the adequacy conditions which
are traditionally imposed on such definitions. I will return to discuss some additional
desiderata which bear on such a determination in §5.1 and §5.5.
4.3.2. The Liar If  (x) is a formula defining a Henkin-complete extension of ACA0
constructed in the manner of §3.3, then we have seen in §4.1 that it is possible to obtain an
undecidable sentence    such that Z `    $ ¬ (p  q) by applying the Diagonal Lemma
directly to ¬ (x). We have also seen how  (x) provides a truth definition for a modelM2 |=
ACA0 which is strongly definable relative to another model M1 |= ACA0+Con(ACA0).   
may thus be likened to a Liar sentence in the sense that it is true in M1 if and only if it
is false in M2.
The availability of the truth definition Tr(x) provides also another means of approaching
the status of the Liar. For since the scope of (4.16) is limited to first-order sentences
(i.e. those of LZ), the existence of a second-order formula (i.e. one of L2Z) defining first-
order arithmetical truth in the sense of (4.16) does not violate Tarski’s undefinability
compared with the informal description of a formal truth definition for type theory
previously provided by Tarski (1935) (see p. 195 and p. 255 in Tarski, 1956). Relative
to the terminology which was adopted later, what Hilbert and Bernays showed is that
True Arithmetic — i.e. the set TA of first-order statements true in the standard model
of LZ – is implicitly definable in the sense that there exists an L2Z-formula with no bound
second-order variables and a single free second-order variable X which is uniquely
satisfied by TA in the standard model of L2Z. This can be shown to be equivalent to
the fact that TA is  11-definable in L2Z — see, e.g., (Rogers, 1987, §15.1.XII). Kreisel &
Wang (1955, p. 104) would also later cite Hilbert & Bernays’s definition as a template





theorem. Nonetheless, it is still possible to construct a Liar-like sentence  Tr by applying
the Diagonal Lemma to ¬Tr(x) so that
(4.18) ACA0 `  Tr $ ¬Tr(p Trq)
In order to assess the status of  Tr, something more must be said about what is meant by
“the” Diagonal Lemma. In its simplest form, this result provides a means of constructing
for every formula '(x) of the language of a theory T interpreting a weak fragment of
arithmetic a sentence  ' such that T `  ' $ '(p 'q). There are a number of formally
distinct means by which  ' can be e↵ectively constructed from '(x).
37 But what matters
for present purposes is how the syntactic complexity of  ' varies with that of '(x). In
order to simplify the discussion, it will thus be useful to assume that this is achieved in
the “canonical” manner by taking  ' = '(subst(m,m)) where m = p'(subst(x, x))q.38
In this case the sentence  Tr obtained by applying the diagonalization procedure to
¬Tr(x) will be equivalent to a ⇧11-formula of LZ.39 And thus since  Tr can be taken to
begin with the prefix “8X” it will not fall under Form0y˙(x) for any y. This purely syntactic
observation can be formalized in ACA0 from which it follows that ACA0 ` ¬Tr(p Trq) and
thus also ACA0 `  Tr. But of course no inconsistency follows from these facts. For since
 Tr is not an LZ-sentence, the fact that ACA0 `  Tr does not entail ACA0 ` Tr(p Trq)
since (4.16) only holds for LZ-sentences. And although we have obtained the sentence
 Tr via a specific diagonalization procedure, it is also easy to see that no fixed point of
¬Tr(x) can be provably equivalent to an LZ-sentence provided that ACA0 is consistent.40
As was originally observed by Kleene (1943, p. 64), in this way the Liar is mathematically
repurposed as a means of demonstrating the non-collapse of the arithmetical and analytical
hierarchies.
The situation is di↵erent when we first use Theorem 3.2 to obtain an arithmetical
interpretation of L2Z and then diagonalize on the image of the second-order truth predicate.
To see this let (·)⇤ : L2Z ! LZ be an interpretation of ACA0 in ACA0+Con(ACA0) obtained
in the manner of Theorem 3.2 and f(x) the definable embedding given by Proposition 3.5.
Also recall that Tr⇤(x) denotes the result of applying the inductive clauses in the definition
of (·)⇤ to the formula Tr(x) while treating x as a free variable. By applying the Diagonal
Lemma to Tr⇤(f(x)) we can now obtain a sentence  Tr⇤ such that
(4.19) ACA0 `  Tr⇤ $ ¬Tr⇤(f(p Tr⇤q))
We can now record the following:
Proposition 4.5 If ACA0 + Con(ACA0) is consistent, then ACA0 6`  Tr⇤ and ACA0 6`
¬ Tr⇤ .
Proof. Since the range of (·)⇤ is LZ, it follows that ¬Tr⇤(f(x)) is an arithmetical formula
from which it follows that  Tr⇤ is an arithmetical sentence. We thus have that ACA0 `
Tr(p Tr⇤q) $  Tr⇤ . Putting this together with (4.19) yields ACA0 ` Tr(p Tr⇤q) $
37 See, e.g., (Halbach & Visser, 2014a) for a discussion of various alternatives.
38 See, e.g., Smoryn´ski, 1985, p. 6).
39 This is immediate if we assume that the language includes the substitution function
subst(x, y). But even without this assumption,  Tr can still be taken to be of the form
9z(✓(k, k, y) ^ '(z)) where ✓(x, y, z) is a ⌃01-formula representing substitution and
k = p9y(✓(x, x, y) ^ '(y))q. In this case  Tr will have the form 9z(✓(k, k, z) ^ ¬Tr(z))
which is provably equivalent to a ⇧11-formula.
40 For by an external induction on the lengths of proofs, we can show that if ACA0 `  1 $
 2 then ACA0 ` Tr(p 1 $  2q) and thus also ACA0 ` Tr(p 1q) $ Tr(p 2q). Thus if
ACA0 `  $  Tr for  2 LZ, then ACA0 ` Tr(p q) $ Tr(p Trq). But now combining
(4.18) and ACA0 ` Tr(p q)$  (since  2 LZ), we would have ACA0 ` ?.
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¬Tr⇤(f(p Tr⇤q)). But note that it also follows from (3.13) that ACA0 ` ¬Tr⇤(f(p Tr⇤q))$
(¬Tr(p Tr⇤q))⇤. We thus obtain ACA0 ` Tr(p Tr⇤q)$ ¬(Tr(p Tr⇤q))⇤. It thus follows by
Corollary 4.2 that Tr(p Tr⇤q) — and hence also  Tr⇤ — are undecidable in ACA0 under
the assumption that ACA0 +Con(ACA0) is consistent. ⇤
4.3.3. The Grelling-Nelson Paradox The paradox concerning the notion heterolog-
ical — i.e. the property possessed by an adjective which does not apply to itself — was
first presented by Nelson & Grelling (1908). Ramsey (1926, p. 353) later grouped it along
with the Liar amongst his list of “epistemological” paradoxes. On the other hand Russell
(1903, p. 80) had already presented a similar contradiction by considering the notion of
predicability — i.e. the property possessed by an expression just in case it is able to serve
as a predicate. On this basis, both Nelson and Grelling (1908, pp. 60-61) and Hilbert
(1917, pp. 193-194), (1928, pp. 890-891) presented this as leading to a paradox about sets
which they explicitly liken to that of Russell.
Although I will develop this parallel further in §5.2, it may also be observed that
such a classification is in the spirit of Hilbert & Bernays’s treatment of the paradoxes
in the Grundlagen. For as we have seen, they took the subject matter of what they
termed “metamathematics” to subsume not only syntactic notions like provability, but also
semantic ones such as truth and denotation. Although he does not mention the paradox
by name, Kreisel (1950, p. 280-281) later observed in passing that reasoning similar to
that of the Grelling-Nelson antinomy can be used to give an alternative reconstruction
of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.41 But it should also not be surprising that this
paradox can be directly converted into an incompleteness result by employing the method
of arithmetization.
First note that once we have given a truth definition for LZ in L2Z, it is straightforward
to also define the satisfaction relation for LZ formulas and closed terms. In particular, if
'(x) is an LZ-formula and t is a closed LZ-term, then we can define Sat(p'(x)q, ptq) =df
Tr(subst(p'(x)q, ptq)). We then can show
(4.20) ACA0 ` Sat(p'(x)q, ptq))$ '(t)
for all LZ-formulas and closed terms t. This allows for a natural formalization of the
predicate heterological as Het(x) =df ¬Sat(x, x).
If we now let h = pHet(x)q then the statement appearing in the Grelling-Nelson paradox
is expressible as the L2Z-sentence Het(h) asserting that Het(x) does not hold of the numeral
corresponding to its own Go¨del number. But it should not come as a surprise that the
paradox is averted in this case in the sense that ACA0 ` Het(phq). For note that this
sentence is equivalent to ¬Tr(p¬Tr(pHet(h)q)q). But this is in turn equivalent to the
assertion that Tr(x) fails to hold of the Go¨del number of a ⇧11-formula – a fact which is
again provable in ACA0 simply in virtue of the syntactic form of ¬Tr(pHet(phq)q).
41 For suppose we have set up a bijective Go¨del numbering of LZ-formulas with one free
variable leading to an enumeration '0(x),'1(x), . . . Then the formula ¬ProvZ(p'x˙(x˙)q)
will appear as 'q(x) for some q 2 N. It thus follows that 'q(q) is equivalent to
"Z =df ¬ProvZ(p¬ProvZ(p'x˙(x˙)q)q) for which it can in turn be shown that Z `
"Z $ ¬ProvZ(p"Zq) – i.e. "Z is a Go¨del sentence for Z and is thus undecidable in Z
(presuming it is !-consistent). When understood in this way, the Go¨del sentence bears
a natural resemblance to the statement arising in the Grelling-Nelson paradox. For
say a formula 'n(x) is autoprovable if it is provable in Z that 'n(x) holds of p'n(x)q
– i.e. ProvZ(p'n(p'n(x)q)q) – and heteroprovable otherwise. Then the statement "Z
just described can be seen as asserting that the property of being heteroprovable is
hetereprovable. But this is just another means of asserting that "Z expresses its own
unprovability. See Kripke (2014) for a similar reconstruction.
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But consider now the formula
(4.21) Het⇤(x) = ¬Sat⇤(f(x), f(x))
Letting h⇤ = pHet⇤(x)q, we have the following:
Proposition 4.6 If ACA0 + Con(ACA0) is consistent, then ACA0 6` Het⇤(ph⇤q) and
ACA0 6` ¬Het⇤(ph⇤q).
Proof. Note that Het⇤(ph⇤q) is provably equivalent to ¬Sat⇤(f(pHet⇤(x)q), f(ph⇤q)) by
(4.21) and thus also to (¬Sat(pHet⇤(x)q, ph⇤q))⇤ by (3.13). On the other hand ACA `
Sat(pHet⇤(x)q, ph⇤q)$ Het⇤(ph⇤q) and thus ACA0 ` (¬Sat(pHet⇤(x)q, ph⇤q))⇤ $ ¬(Het⇤(ph⇤q))⇤.
We thus obtain that ACA0 ` Het⇤(ph⇤q) $ ¬(Het⇤(ph⇤q))⇤, from which it follows that
Het⇤(ph⇤q) is undecidable in ACA0 if ACA0+Con(ACA0) is consistent by Corollary 4.2. ⇤
§5. Discussion After presenting a result similar to Propopsition 4.3, Kreisel (1950,
p. 280↵.) commented at length on its relationship to Go¨del’s original proof of the first
incompleteness theorem. He begins as follows:
Both the present paper and Go¨del (1931b) use the diagonal (non-enumerability)
argument to construct undecided propositions. Though this point is ob-
vious, it seems worth mentioning: for one thing it connects undecidabil-
ity proofs which are usually referred to as paradoxes and self references,
with a familiar technique of mathematics, and, roughly speaking, allows
one to convert non-enumerability proofs into those of undecidability. But
also it throws light on the diagonal argument, and its “permissibility”
e.g. Borel (1898).
In commenting on his generalizations of Kreisel’s result, Wang (1955, p. 32) went a step
further in relating formal incompleteness to di↵erent means of resolving the paradoxes:
These results, it is hoped, will throw some new light on the semantic
paradoxes. Moreover, like the result of Kreisel (1950), the conclusions are
also of interest in that they connect indefinable classes and relations with
undecidable sentences. There seems to be a certain similarity between
this situation and the possibility of two di↵erent methods of avoiding
mathematical paradoxes: the usual way of refusing to countenance a
class R of all classes which are not self-members, and the alternative
approach of admitting such a class R but treating as undecidable the
question whether R belongs to R.
These passages suggest that both Kreisel and Wang regarded the paradoxes as origi-
nating from a common source which is not overtly metamathematical in character.42 In
42 Kreisel’s allusion to Borel appears to refer to pp. 107-109 of (1898). In this section Borel
first presents and then critiques Cantor’s use of an enumeration of the characteristic
functions of the subsets of a given set E in order to show its powerset is of cardinality
greater than E. (Borel’s complaint was that although Cantor’s method can be used
to show that the set of discontinuous functions on R is of cardinality greater than
that of the continuum, it does not provide a means by which we can conceive of the
elements of this set.) Kreisel additionally refers (1950, p. 280) to Hilbert & Bernays’s
use of diagonalization to show the existence of a total recursive function which is not
primitive recursive (1934, p. 330/335) (and which is in fact already anticipated by
Hilbert’s (1926, pp. 388-391) discussion of the Ackermann’s (1928) definition of a non-
primitive recursive function in relation to the diagonal method). Kreisel additionally
would also have most likely been aware of Lebesgue’s (1905) and Lusin’s (1925) use of
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light of this, Wang’s further proposal can be understood as o↵ering a choice between
two alternatives: i) on the one hand, it is possible to regard the paradoxes as arising
from the misapplication of definitions which, when properly understood, fail to determine
sets; ii) on the other hand, it is also possible to understand the definitions in question as
determining classes but doing so in a manner such that paradoxical reasoning is blocked
by the undecidability of particular statements about membership.
The results of §4 are indeed suggestive that formal undecidability might play a role in a
uniform response to the paradoxes in the manner of Wang’s second alternative. A thorough
philosophical evaluation of this proposal is beyond the scope of the present paper. However
in the remainder of this section, I will explore five questions which such an approach would
need to confront were it to be further articulated: 1) How are the undecidability results in
question related to Hilbert & Bernays’s original concerns about proving the consistency
of infinitary mathematics by finitary means? 2) Does the approach of §4 in fact lead to a
unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes? 3) Is it reasonable to regard the
undecidable statements obtained there as genuinely indeterminate in truth value (which,
as we will see, Kreisel appears to have thought)? 4) Should these results be regarded as
extensional or intensional in the sense of Feferman (1960, §1)? 5) How do the methods and
results developed in §4 interface with more recent work on axiomatic theories of truth?
5.1. Resolution? The developments surveyed in §2 – §4 illustrate a pathway from
the paradoxes to the phenomenon of formal incompleteness. Hilbert & Bernays devoted
much of the second volume of the Grundlagen to expositing Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rems and investigating their interaction with various proof theoretic methods. In the first
volume, however, it is the problem of ensuring that theories su cient for the development
of analysis are free from contradiction which sets the tone for their exposition of the
finitary standpoint. In fact it was this concern which led them to propose the method of
arithmetization described in §2:
We are therefore forced to investigate the consistency of theoretical
systems without considering actuality, and thus we find ourselves already
at the standpoint of formal axiomatics. Now, one usually treats this
problem — both in geometry and the disciplines of physics — with the
method of arithmetization. The objects of a theory are represented by
numbers or systems of numbers and the basic relations by equations
or inequations, such that, on the basis of this translation, the axioms
of the theory turn out either as arithmetical identities or provable sen-
tences . . . or as a system of conditions whose joint satisfiability can be
demonstrated via arithmetical existence sentences. (1939, p. 3/3)
Comparison of Hilbert & Bernays’s informal description of the method of arithmeti-
zation (1934, pp. 18-19/18-19) with their presentation of the Arithmetized Completeness
Theorem (1939, pp. 234-253/243-263) suggests that they ultimately came to regard the
latter as a mathematical embodiment of the former. And although no further use of this
result is made in the Grundlagen itself, Bernays (1954a, §19) later presented a detailed
construction of an arithmetical model of GB  = GB - Infinty using techniques similar to
those of §3.3. Although this theory does not entail the existence of infinite sets, it does
prove the existence of infinite classes — e.g. that of all finite ordinals. And as is shown
by Bernays (1942), it also allows for a development similar to that proposed at the end of
the Grundlagen. As such, GB  is typical of the theories which Hilbert & Bernays’s spoke
diagonal arguments to demonstrate hierarchy theorems for point classes in descriptive
set theory.
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of as involving “idealization [which] . . . transcends the realm of experience and intuitive
self-evidence” (1939, p. 3/3).43
It is thus notable that Bernays described his construction of an arithmetical model
of GB  via the Henkin method as “establish[ing] in a constructive sense” (1954a, p. 93)
the consistency of GB  within “the frame of the number theoretic formal system Z of
Grundlagen der Mathematik with certain additions” (1954a, p. 88) (where the “additions”
in question consist of various extensions by definition). This terminology reflects on the
one hand that the construction does indeed provide a relative consistency proof for GB 
in PA.44 And on the other, it reflects that by this point Bernays had independently come
to accept results in infinitary proof-theory as providing su cient evidence to secure the
consistency of first-order arithmetic.45
Bernays’s comments on the method of arithmetization stand in contrast to the evalu-
ation of the consistency proof for PA using the truth definition Tr(x) which is presented
in the Grundlagen (1939, §5.2e). This is a rendition of the (now) familiar “semantic
argument” for the consistency of PA – i.e. if it can be shown that the axioms of PA fall
under Tr(x) and that the rules of first-order logic preserve truth, then it is also possible
to demonstrate the global reflection principle for PA
(5.1) 8x((SentLZ(x) ^ ProvPA(x))! Tr(x))
and thus also its consistency.46
Hilbert & Bernays describe the semantic argument after their proof of the second
incompleteness theorem in order to address the question of whether the introduction of
“bound formula variables” is required to prove the consistency of PA (1939, p. 329/342).
This argument can indeed be formalized in a system of second-order arithmetic in which
it is possible to either prove the existence of a class corresponding to the extension of
Tr(x) or in which induction can be directly performed on predicates defined in terms of
this formula.47 But as was observed by Mostowski (1950) in the set theoretic case, this
43 This is how Hilbert & Bernays described the sorts of infinitary systems which arise in
the axiomatization of geometry and physics alluded to in the passage cited above.
The use of the expression “method of arithmetization” in the Grundlagen should
thus not be understood simply as a redescription of Go¨del’s arithmetization of syntax
(although it is reasonable to suppose Bernays came to view this as an application of
the method). Rather it is intended to describe the more general use of arithmetical
models which Hilbert had first employed in his consistency and independence proofs
for various systems of geometry in (1899) and axiomatizations of physics in (1916). See
also (Bernays, 1930, p. 253) for a related description.
44 Recall that PA corresponds to the system which Hilbert & Bernays call Z. The full
system is needed for Bernays’s result whose proof is similar to the model expansion
argument which was introduced by Novak (1950) to prove the relative consistency of
GB over ZF.
45 This topic is explored in (1939, §5.3) wherein Hilbert & Bernays present Gentzen’s
(1936) consistency proof in the context of considering potential extensions of the finitary
standpoint as characterized at the beginning of the Grundlagen. It is also evident from
Bernays’s later philosophical writings (e.g. Bernays, 1954b) that he grew increasingly
sympathetic to consistency proofs based on transfinite induction and other broadly
constructive techniques.
46 In fact Hilbert & Bernays (1939, p. 338/351-352) provide what is apparently the first
explicit statement of the global reflection principle as well as sketching the semantic
argument for PA in a system similar to second-order arithmetic. See (Dean, 2015) for
discussion of the subsequent reception and significance of these developments.
47 The theory  11-CA0 is su cient relative to the former criterion. A theory which is
su cient relative to the latter is the system ACA in which the induction axiom of
ACA0 is replaced by the full-second order induction scheme.
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argument cannot be used to prove the consistency of ZF in a second-order system such
as GB which provides only predicative comprehension.48 It is easy to see that the same is
true for ACA0 with respect to PA. Such an observation is in line with Hilbert & Bernays’s
remark that their proof of (5.1) is “not of finitary character” (1939, p. 338/351). And
they went on to contend that the second-order definability of Tr(x) does not provide a
means of determining whether this formula holds of arbitrary LZ-sentences nor does it
supply finitary justification for the application of tertium non datur to number theoretic
reasoning (1939, pp. 338-339/351).
In regard to the latter point, Mostowski later observed that “since the ‘whole theory
of truth’ makes it possible to prove the consistency of a system for which the notion of
satisfaction has been defined, we infer that certain properties of the notion for [ZF] cannot
be established in [GB]” (1950, p. 112). On the other hand, Mostowski also remarked that
GB provides a “good” (p. 118) theory of truth in the sense that it allows us to derive all
of the T-biconditionals (4.16) and compositional clauses (4.17) for Tr(x) as schema for
LZ-sentences. But the inability of such a theory to formalize the semantic argument is a
manifestation of the fact that it does not prove the uniform version of the compositional
clause for negation — i.e.
(5.2) 8x(SentLZ(x)! (Tr(¬˙x)$ ¬Tr(x)))
As a consequence, ACA0 also does not prove the uniform version of the law of the excluded
middle with respect to Tr(x) — i.e. 8x(SentLZ(x)! (Tr(x) _ Tr(¬˙x))).
One might conclude on this basis that such systems provide “highly incomplete” theories
of truth relative to the standards which Tarski (1956, p. 257) ultimately appears to
have advocated.49 But Hilbert & Bernays’s investigation of the truth predicate was not
motivated by a desire to study its (putative) role in informal reasoning in the style of
more recent axiomatic theories of truth which I will discuss further in §5.5. For as we
have just seen, they put little stock in the use of a second-order truth definition in a
formal consistency proof. And on the other hand, we have also seen that their original
presentation of the paradoxes in (1939, §5.1a) was not intended to highlight the role of
the axiomatic approach as such but rather to serve the expository role of showing how the
formalization of the Liar leads to incompleteness rather than formal inconsistency.
Hilbert & Bernays originally expanded on this point in (1939, §5.1b,c) by showing in the
(now) familiar manner that the formalization of the proof of Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem leads to his second incompleteness theorem. But we have seen that a similar moral
can be reached more directly by applying the method of arithmetization to a theory like
ACA0 over which it is possible to formalize a truth definition for LZ-sentences by a ⌃11-
formula of L2Z. In particular, this leads to the consideration of the LZ-formula Tr⇤(x)
obtained by applying an interpretation (·)⇤ of ACA0 in (e.g.) PA+Con(ACA0) which is in
turn similar to that employed in Bernay’s relative consistency proof for GB . As we have
seen, the Liar-like sentence  Tr⇤ which may then be obtained by diagonalizing on Tr
⇤(x)
is indeed undecidable in ACA0 (and, mutatis muntandis, over stronger theories as well).
We thus reach the conclusion that when the method of arithmetization is applied to
interpret the “idealizing assumption” embodied by the use of impredicative second-order
quantification involved in the truth definition, the fear that an inconsistency in the style
of the Liar will arise is abated by the undecidability of  Tr⇤ . Note that this point remains
48 Tarski (1935, p. 317, p. 359) (p. 198, p. 237 in the English translation in (1956)) also
mentions the possibility of providing a similar consistency proof using his own truth
definition. But he later added a footnote (1956, p. 237) acknowledging Mostowski’s
result and the necessity of employing a metatheory which is su ciently strong to
formalize the relevant induction.
49 See (Halbach, 2011, §3) for a recent re-endorsement of this view.
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even if we take ourselves to lack finitary evidence for the consistency of a theory like
ACA0 or GB
 . For although we must assume the formal consistency statement for such a
theory in order to apply the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, doing so allows us to
see how the antinomies which might originally have made us suspicious about consistency
are transformed not into contradictions but rather instances of formal incompleteness.50
As we have seen, a similar route to Wang’s second alternative may also be distilled from
the set theoretic paradoxes by constructing arithmetical interpretations of systems similar
to GB in the manner of Bernays’s (1954a) proof. But at least two questions remain: 1) does
such an approach point to a unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes? 2)
are the independent sentences which are constructed in this manner decidable on the basis
of further mathematical considerations or do they represent a di↵erent or more abiding
form of incompleteness?
5.2. Unification? The first step of the method outlined at the beginning of §4
for transforming paradoxes into incompleteness results was to show how the relevant
“paradoxical notions” – e.g. that of non-self membership, ordinality, truth, or satisfaction
— can be formalized in the language of a two-sorted theory such as GB or ACA0. These
systems make a distinction of type — e.g. between sets or numbers and classes — and
order — e.g. between predicative and impredicative formulas. It is thus not surprising
that the resolutions of Russell’s paradox and the Liar which they provide are similar to
the type-theoretic resolution originally envisioned by Russell (1908) and later extended
by Tarski (1935) in terms of a hierarchy of metalanguages.51
To briefly review the initial parallels:
1) The predicate ⇢(x) = x 62 x defines a class R over GB. On the other hand, GB
refutes the formula M(R) asserting that R is a set. Thus although GB ` R 62 R,
this does not lead to a contradiction since the definition of R only allows us to infer
X 2 R from X 62 R in the case that X is a set.
2) The language of second-order arithmetic may be used as a metalanguage for that of
first-order arithmetic in the sense that there is an L2Z-formula Tr(x) which provably
satisfies Tarski’s Convention T for LZ-formulas over ACA0. On the other hand, the
Liar sentence  Tr for this predicate is not a LZ formula. Thus although ACA0 `
¬Tr(p Trq), this does not lead to a contradiction since the definition of Tr(x) only
allows us to infer ¬' from ¬Tr(p'q) in the case where ' 2 LZ.
The definability of the naming function N(x) for predicative classes discussed above
allows us to extend these parallels in what is now likely to be an expected direction. Note
first that we can modify our prior definition of N(x) to obtain a definition of a function
Na(x) which enumerates only arithmetical classes which may be proven to be subsets !.
50 Of course the question remains as to whether Hilbert or any of his interlocutors ever
took seriously the possibility that the sort of theories of second order arithmetic in which
they sought to formalize analysis might have been inconsistent. On one side of this issue
was Weyl (1918, p. 21) who had famously remarked that impredicative definitions of
real numbers trap us “in an endless circle, in absurdities and contradictions entirely
analogous to Russell’s well-known paradox . . .” However neither in (Weyl, 1918) nor
in (Weyl, 1919) does he describe a concrete means by which such an analogy might
be exploited to yield a contradiction in a theory such as Z2 or one of its subsystems.
And in apparent response Hilbert (1922, vol 2., p. 1118) made clear just how dubious
he regarded this claim: “[T]he paradoxes of set theory cannot be regarded as proving
that the concept of a set of integers leads to contradictions. On the contrary: all our
mathematical experience speaks for the correctness and consistency of this concept.”
51 See (Church, 1976) for further comparison of Russell’s and Tarski’s resolutions to the
paradoxes.
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In parallel, we can also set up an indexing of predicative LS-formulas '0(x),'1(x), . . .
defining arithmetical classes such that all n 2 N
(5.3) S ` 8x(x 2 Na(n)$ 'n(x))
Following Mostowski (1950) we can additionally carry out the definitions of truth and
satisfaction given in §4.3 in S as well as in ACA0. Putting these observations together
allows us to define a satisfaction predicate SatS(x, y) based on the indexing of formulas
determined by Na(x) such that
(5.4) S ` SatS(n,m)$ 'n(m)$ m 2 Na(n)
Now consider the predicate ⇢a(x) = x 2 ! ^ x 62 Na(x) and observe that S ` 8x(⇢a(x)$
x 2 ! ^ ¬SatS(x, x)). As was the case for the predicate ⇢0(x) considered in §4.2, if Na(x)
were predicatively definable, ⇢a(x) would be as well. And from this it would also follow
that ⇢a(x) ⌘ 'j(x) for some j 2 N. In this case 'j(n) would hold just in case ¬Sats(n, n)
— i.e. if the predicate 'n(x) failed to hold of the number naming the class which it defined.
But this is just another way of saying that 'j(x) is heterological in the sense defined in
§4.3.3. By taking n = j we would thus have S ` SatS(j, j) $ ¬SatS(j, j) by (5.4). This
illustrates just how closely the Russell and Grelling-Nelson antinomies are related in the
context of two-sorted set theories like S or GB which have the capacity to formalize the
naming relation. But it also illustrates how the type-theoretic distinction between sets
and classes imposed by these theories relates to the order-theoretic distinction between
predicative and impredicative definitions.
In contrast to this, the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can be viewed as collapsing
the distinction between both order and type on which the many familiar resolutions of
the paradoxes depend. By way of illustration, suppose that T is a theory of second-order
arithmetic such as ACA0 formulated over L2Z and that (·)⇤ : L2T ! LZ is an interpretation
of T in Z+Con(T) provided by Theorem 3.2. In this case, the image of an L2Z-formula '
— i.e. one which potentially contains bound second-order variables – will be a first-order
LZ-formula '⇤. In particular, quantifiers of the form 8X . . . and 9X . . . in ' will thus be
replaced with first-order quantifiers restricted by an appropriate domain predicate of the
form 8x( 2(x)! . . .) and 9x( 2(x) ^ . . .) in '⇤.52
Recall that in three of the four cases we have considered, the statements shown to be
undecidable via arithmetized completeness constructions are provably equivalent over T
to the negation of their own interpretation under (·)⇤ — i.e. they are instances of the
schema
(5.5) T ` '$ ¬'⇤
52 ACA0 can be viewed as representing the first in a hierarchy of systems defined by
adjoining to PA comprehension principles for formulas with bound variables ranging
only over numbers (which determine level one classes), with bound variables ranging
only over level one classes (which determine level two classes), . . . the union of which
Church (1956, §58) refers to as ramified second-order arithmetic. In this setting it is
possible to draw a partial analogy between the function served by Russell’s Axiom
of Reducibility and the statement of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. The
relevant version of the former would state that for every impredicatively defined level-
n class, there exists a coextensive level 1-class. On the other hand, if (·)⇤ : L2T ! LZ is
defined as above, then the interpretation of an impredicative L2Z formula '(x) defining
a set A ✓ N, there will be an LZ-formula '⇤(x) defining a set A⇤ ✓ N. It is easy to see
that A and A⇤ must coincide extensionally for all n 2 N for which ACA0 decides the
truth value of '(n). But it follows from the existence of sets K from Proposition 4.3
that there will be cases in which A and A⇤ are provably non-coextensive.
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This can be understood to reflect the conventional classification of the Russell, Liar, and
Grelling-Nelson antinomies as paradoxes of self-reference.53 But via arithmetization it is
also possible to understand these paradoxes semantically in the sense that (·)⇤ strongly
defines a model of M2 |= T relative to a model M1 |= T + Con(T). As we have seen,
the relevant undecidable statements can also be interpreted as asserting of themselves
that they are true in M1 if and only if they are false in M2. And thus if we are willing
to assume Con(T), the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can also be understood as
showing that it is possible to describe consistent situations in which the statements on
either side of the biconditionals are true.
This also illustrates the sort of dissolution of the paradoxes in virtue of undecidability
which Wang appears to have envisioned. Suppose, for instance, that the Liar sentence is
understood to arise not from a defined formula like Tr(x), but rather from a primitive
predicate T(x) intended to express the “everyday” or “naive” notion of truth about which
we are attempting to reason axiomatically. As I will discuss further in §5.5, it is often
said in this context that there is no reason to prefer the truth of one side of the resulting
Liar biconditional  T over the other and thus also no reason to expect that a theory of
truth should decide the truth value of  T. This suggests that the undecidability of  Tr⇤ is
consistent with our expectations about the resolution of the Liar.54
In the case of Russell’s paradox, however, the iterative conception of set partially codi-
fied by the Axiom of Regularity gives us independent grounds for rejecting the existence
of self-membered sets and thus for deciding in favor of R 62 R over R 2 R (the non-set-
hood of R notwithstanding). But as we have seen, Kreisel’s original incompleteness result
concerns not R, but rather an arithmetized analog of the collection R0 consisting of those
numbers which are not members of the classes which they name. We have seen that no
predicative definition of the collection R0 is possible. But if we additionally attempt to
probe our “naive” intuitions about the nameability relation, it would seem that there is no
abiding reason to think that the number which names R0 (were one to exist) either should
or should not be a member of R0. And as I will now discuss, this appears to conform with
what Kreisel himself thought about the status of the undecidable sentence k 2 K obtained
in Proposition 4.3.
5.3. Absolute undecidability? Kreisel (1950, p. 267) originally formulated a
version of Proposition 4.3 in the course of attempting to confirm a conjecture of Bernays
(Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, p. 191/199) — i.e. that the predicate calculus is not complete
with respect to models in which all predicates are computable [berechenbare], or as we
would now say,  01-definable. This informed his discussion of the distinction between the
Go¨del sentence  Z for an arithmetical theory Z such as PA and the undecidable Kreisel
sentence k 2 K obtained in Proposition 4.3 over a system similar to S. We would now
53 On the other hand, the current setting highlights the additional complications required
to formalize the reasoning of antinomies such as the paradoxes of reciprocated
or grounded classes which are themselves simplifications of the Burali-Forti and
Mirimano↵ paradoxes. Pace Priest (1994), this suggests that the classification of these
antinomies as paradoxes of self-reference is in need of further refinement.
54 Wang (1963, p. 386) would later liken his “second approach” to the paradoxes to the
proposal of Fitch (1952) of blocking the reasoning of Russell’s paradox by denying that
the law of the excluded middle holds for the statement R 2 R (see §18). Fitch’s proposal
is based on his claim that both R 2 R and the Liar express “indefinite propositions”
which lack truth values. But his account of why this is so (1952, §1.4) amounts to
little more than the observation that were these statements to possess a definite truth
value then a contradiction would be derivable in the calculus he describes. While this
approach is also reminiscent of that adopted by certain axiomatic theories of truth (see
§5.5), Fitch’s proposal can also be contrasted with the one proposed here in virtue of
failing to provide an independent explanation of the relevant failure of excluded middle.
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express his point by saying that while  Z is a ⇧
0
1-sentence, k 2 K can be taken to have the
form of either a ⌃02 or a ⇧
0
2-sentence. This follows immediately from the biconditional (4.6)
together with the fact that Theorem 3.2 yields a  02 definition of 2⇤. But whichever form
we take k 2 K to have, it cannot be equivalent to a  01-formula as all such statements are
decidable in Z.55
On the other hand, recall that  Z is provably equivalent over Z to 8x¬ProofZ(x, p Zq)
which is a ⇧01 statement. Go¨del’s proof of the first incompleteness theorem shows that if Z
is !-consistent then Z 6` ¬ Z. But as Kreisel (1950, p. 278) observed,  Z must then be true
in the standard model N .56 However Kreisel also observed that there is no evident way
to extend this familiar observation beyond the class of ⇧01-statements to argue from the
undecidability of a ⇧02- or ⌃
0
2-sentence like k 2 K to its truth or falsity. On this basis he
suggested that predicates defining classes such asK should be understood as “not [making]
a division of integers into two classes T, F but rather three T, F, U” (1950, p. 283). Kreisel
echoed more explicitly the view that class (as opposed to set) membership need not be
understood as bivalent in (1967, p. 143) in the context of formulating a theory of sets and
what he refers to as definable properties which is otherwise similar to S (pp. 162-165).
And he later went so far as to remark that “nobody has any idea whether [k 2 K] is true
or false” (Kreisel, 1969, p. 112).57
In order to understand what might be at stake with such pronouncements, it is useful to
recall that Kreisel (1967, pp. 151-152) himself proposed a three-way classification of for-
mally undecidable statements. The first class contains metamathematical ⇧01-statements
like  Z whose undecidability entails their truth via the sort of argument just rehearsed. The
second class contains the Continuum Hypothesis which Kreisel (1967, p. 150) famously
argued is such that either it or its negation is a second-order logical truth. And the third
contains examples like the Parallel Postulate which he observed are such that their truth
values are not fixed by adopting a second-order formulation of the geometric axioms.58
To take seriously Kreisel’s apparent proposal about the non-bivalence of class mem-
bership or Wang’s related suggestion that the paradoxes can be avoided by “admitting
paradoxical classes” but “treating as undecided” questions about membership within
them, more still needs to be said about the formal properties of the undecidable sentences
constructed in §4. As I will suggest below, such statements do not fit comfortably into
any of Kreisel’s categories. In order to see why this is so it will be useful to first highlight
several respects in which they are similar to prototypical members of the first class. But
I will then suggest that they also have an important a nity with both the second and
third.
5.4. Intensionality Feferman (1960) originally classified Go¨del’s first incomplete-
ness theorem for PA as an extensional result in the sense that the undecidability of its Go¨del
55 Kreisel (1950, p. 275) claimed on this basis that Proposition 4.3 is already su cient to
provide an answer to Hilbert & Bernays’s question. But as Wang (1953) later observed,
the fact that the specific predicate 2⇤ constructed in this proof yields an undecidable
statement is not on its own su cient to show that there does not exist an arithmetical
model of S in which the interpretation of 2 is recursive. The non-existence of such an
interpretation was later shown by Rabin (1958) using an argument involving recursively
inseparable sets similar to the one which is now typically employed in the proof of
Tennenbaum’s Theorem (e.g. Kaye, 1991, §11).
56 For if it were false, then N |= ProofZ(n, p Zq) for some n 2 N. But since Z is su ciently
strong to prove all true  00-statements, then Z ` ProofZ(n, p Zq) and thus Z ` ¬ Z.
57 See, (Manevitz & Stavi, 1980, p. 146) and (Isaacson, 2011, p. 54) for similar assessments
which anticipate the argument of §5.4.
58 I.e. when the Continuity Axioms — V in (Hilbert, 1899) — are formalized as second-
order statements rather than first-order schemes.
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sentence  PA only depends on the fact that the arithmetical formula employed to formalize
provability weakly represents derivability from its axioms. But he also famously illustrated
a sense in which Go¨del’s second theorem is intensional by showing that in addition to the
“canonical” consistency statement Con(PA) — for which PA 6` Con(PA) as long as is PA
consistent — it is also possible to construct a formula Con0(PA) expressing consistency
relative to a di↵erent binumeration of the axioms of PA such that PA ` Con0(PA).
Other parameters which have the potential for introducing similar sensitivities into the
formulation of undecidability results include the following:
i) the arithmetical encoding which is chosen to Go¨del number terms and formulas;
ii) the chosen form of the Diagonal Lemma which is employed to generate “self-
referential” statements;
iii) the definitions of proof and provability on which the definition of formulas such as
Con(T) are based.59
It is thus also natural to ask how the intensional aspects of arithmetization bear on the
results of §4.
For concreteness, let T be a recursively axiomatizable LZ-theory extending I⌃2. The
simplest example of an undecidable statement we have considered is the Liar-like sentence
   constructed in Lemma 4.1 by diagonalizing directly on the formula  (x) which defines
a Henkin-completion of T. By examining the details of this construction, it is easy to
see that parameters i) – iii) all contribute to the identity of    and thus also to that of
the other undecidable statements constructed in §4. But this is also true of a number of
parameters specific to the formalization of the Henkin construction on which the definition
of  (x) is based. A non-exhaustive list of these is as follows:
iv) the extension of the Go¨del numbering p·q to the Henkin language LHT ;
v) the enumeration  0, 1, . . . of LHT -sentences which are used on the inductive con-
struction of the sets  iT;
vi) the method by which representatives from equivalence classes of Henkin constants
up to provable equality in  T are selected;
vii) the extension condition by which the set  i+1T is defined relative to  
i
T;
viii) the manner in which the formula  (x) formalizing membership in  T is itself defined
on the basis of the other parameters.
In order to gauge the extent to which these parameters bear on the results of §4, consider
an LT-formula ⇢(x) satisfying the following derivability-like conditions:
If T ` ', then T+Con(T) ` ⇢(p'q).(5.6a)
T ` ⇢(p¬'q)$ ¬⇢(p'q)(5.6b)
By mimicking the reasoning of Lemma 4.1 we obtain
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that ⇢(x) satisfies (5.6a,b) and that   is such that T `   $
¬⇢(p q). If T+Con(T) is consistent, then   is undecidable in T.
It is not hard to see that if  (x) is defined as in §3.3 it will satisfy (5.6a,b) as long as
the formulas ProvT(x) and Con(T) are defined canonically — in fact these properties are
consequences of (3.7a,e). And from this it follows that the undecidability of the formula
59 See (Halbach & Visser, 2014a,b) for a systematic study of how varying any of i) - iii)
can a↵ect the provability or refutability of Henkin or truth-teller sentences for partial
truth predicates.
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   obtained in Corollary 4.2 will not depend on any of the parameters i)–ii) and iv)–
x).60 In virtue of (4.1c), this observation extends to sentences such as k 2 K,  Tr⇤ , or
Het⇤(h⇤) which are provably equivalent to their negations under the interpretation (·)⇤.
Thus although the method by which these statements are shown to be undecidable di↵ers
from that by which Go¨del originally showed the undecidability of  Z, the results of §4 are
also reasonably invariant with respect to the intensional parameters enumerated above.
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that statements like    do not resemble
Go¨del sentences in other respects. For suppose that T, ProvT(x), and Con(T) are defined
canonically. Another familiar observation is that if ' is a fixed point of the formula
¬ProvT(x) — i.e. T ` ' $ ¬ProvT(p'q) — then T ` ' $ Con(T). Thus all Go¨del
sentences for T are provably equivalent to the canonical consistency statement for T and
hence to one another.
But now consider the predicate ¬ (x). As we have seen, the Diagonal Lemma yields
the existence of a sentence  ¬  such that T `  ¬  $ ¬ (p ¬ q). While both  (x) and
ProvT(x) satisfy (5.6a), only  (x) satisfies (5.6b). But in virtue of this we have T `
¬ (p ¬ q) $  (p¬ ¬ q) and thus also T ` ¬ ¬  $ ¬ (p¬ ¬ q). It hence follows that
¬ ¬  is another provable fixed point of ¬ (x) which is not provably equivalent to  ¬ 
(unless T is inconsistent).
These considerations suggest that the undecidable statements constructed in §4 di↵er
from traditional Go¨del sentences in that they lack what can reasonably be described as
a canonical form. This leaves open the possibility that their truth values in the standard
model are also not fixed independently of the decisions we make about the various in-
tensional parameters. That this is indeed the case can be demonstrated by investigating
further the role of parameter v) — i.e. the selection of an enumeration  0, 1, . . . of LHT -
sentences — in the formalization of the Henkin procedure.
Suppose that we have fixed choices for parameters i) and iv) so that we have a Go¨del
numbering of LHT and that the enumeration in question is also given by some fixed recursive
function  j(x) such that  j(0) = p 0q, j(1) = p 1q, . . . Additionally suppose that we
have fixed parameter vii) in accordance with (3.6) such that a formula  i is added to the
set  iT just in case  
i
T [ { i} is consistent (as in Henkin, 1949). Now suppose that ' is
undecidable in T and that ' is also the first sentence in the enumeration — i.e. ' =  0.
Since in this case T 6` ¬', we will thus have that ' 2  1T and thus also ' 2  T. If  (x)
formalizes the definition of  T based on these choices, then we will also have N |=  (p'q)
— i.e. when our formalization of the Henkin construction is carried out relative to the
standard model, ' will be included in the maximally consistent set of sentences defined
by  (x). By parallel reasoning, if it turned out that ¬' =  0, then we would have that
N |=  (p¬'q) and thus also N |= ¬ (p'q).61
60 This is in conformity with Feferman’s (1960, p. 39) original characterization of Theorem
3.2 as a result of “mixed extensional and intensional type”. For as he observes, while the
proof does depend on the fact that Con(T) is defined canonically, it does not depend
on the formula we have chosen to binumerate the axioms of T in defining the predicate
ProvT(x). Note, however, that this is a parameter which we do not otherwise need to
be concerned with in the case where T is a finitely axiomatizable theory such as GB or
ACA0.
61 Manevitz & Stavi (1980) similarly observed that by defining Con1(T) = Con(T) and
Conn+1(T) = Con(T + Conn(T)) and defining an enumeration which begins with
Con1(T),Con2(T),Conn 1(T),¬Conn(T) we are able to control the number of times
which certain definitions of  (x) may be iterated before the set defined by the iterates
 0(x) =  (x),  i+1(x) =  i(p (x˙)q) becomes inconsistent. On the other hand, they also
showed (1980, §3) that there exist other definitions of  (x) (which can even be  02)
whose iterates define consistent sets for all i 2 N. As Kreisel’s “model theoretic” proof
of the second incompleteness theorem (as presented by Smorynski, 1977, §6) depends
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Next let f0(x, y) and f1(x, y) be recursive functions such that if  j(x) determines an
enumeration of sentences as above, then  f0(j,k)(x) determines the enumeration which lists
 k first and then continues as  j(x) but omitting  k — i.e.  k, 0, 1, . . . , k 1, k+1, . . .
(presuming k > 0) – and  f1(j,k)(x) determines the enumeration which lists ¬ k first
and then continues as  j(x) — i.e. ¬ k, 0, 1, . . . , k 1, k+1, . . . In cases where the
undecidability of a given sentence ' does not depend on the choice of an enumeration
of LHT itself (e.g. Go¨del sentences), these definitions allow us to uniformly define Henkin-
completions of T in which  (p'q) is either true or false in N simply by fixing the stage at
which ' is enumerated.
On the other hand, the construction of    clearly does depend on the definition of  (x)
and hence on the chosen enumeration. Nonetheless, we can obtain the following:
Proposition 5.2 Let T be as above. Then there exist LT-formulas  0(x) and  1(x)
defining Henkin-complete extensions of T such that the statements   0 and   1 respec-
tively obtained by applying the Diagonal Lemma to ¬ 0(x) and ¬ 1(x) have the following
properties: i) if T+Con(T) is consistent, then   0 and   1 are both undecidable in T; ii)
  0 is false in N ; iii)   1 is true in N .
Proof. We have just seen that it is possible to parameterize the definition of the formula
 i(x) defining a Henkin-complete extension of T based on the extension condition (3.6) in
the index i of a given enumeration — say  i(x) =  0, 1, . . . — of LHT -formulas. Since a
standard formalization of the Diagonal Lemma allows us to e↵ectively construct a fixed-
point formula for  i(x), there is also a recursive function g(i) such that T `  g(i) $
¬ i(p g(i)q). We may hence consider the enumerations  f0(i,g(i))(x) and  f1(i,g(i))(x)
whose first elements are respectively  g(i) and ¬ g(i). By the Recursion Theorem (e.g.
Rogers, 1987, §11.2) there exist n0, n1 2 N such that  f0(n0,g(n0))(x) =  n0(x) and
 f1(n1,g(n1))(x) =  n1(x).  n0(x) and  n1(x) hence respectively define enumerations
beginning with  g(n0) and ¬ g(n1) and which are also such that
T `  g(n0) $ ¬ n0(p g(n0)q)(5.7a)
T `  g(n1) $ ¬ n1(p g(n1)q)(5.7b)
Since  n0(x) and  n1(x) satisfy (5.6a,b),  0 =df  g(n0) and  1 =df  g(n1) will both be
undecidable in T provided that T + Con(T) is consistent. Since  0 and ¬ 1 occur first
in the enumerations respectively defined by  n0(x) and  n1(x), we will hence have thatN |=  n0(p 0q) andN |=  n1(p¬ 1q) and thus alsoN |= ¬ n1(p 1q). But now by (5.7a,b),
we also have N |= ¬ 0 and N |=  1. ⇤
Proposition 5.2 shows that the truth value of    is indeed not fixed independently
of the definition of the Henkin-completion  (x) relative to which it is defined. But one
might still attempt to fix the truth value of such a statement by restricting attention to
definitions of  (x) satisfying conditions which might be argued to characterize “canonical”
formalizations of the Henkin procedure. In fact Kreisel (1965, §3.222) provided a precedent
for this approach by proposing that we should regard an arithmetical formula ProvT as
“canonically representing” provability in a theory T if its structure reflects that of the
inductive definition of the derivability relation T ` '.62
Pace Kreisel, Halbach & Visser (2014a) provide a number of examples which illustrate
that such judgements of “resemblance” between metatheoretic and object language def-
initions are di cult to make precise, even in the case of provability. As we have seen, a
on the fact that  i(x) defines an inconsistent set for some i, this illustrates a sense in
which this result is also intensional in Feferman’s sense.
62 Such a definition must evidently be ⌃01. Kreisel’s criterion is thus su cient to exclude
from consideration the provability predicate involved in Feferman’s (1960) definition of
Con0(PA) mentioned at the beginning of this section which is  02.
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formalization of the Henkin procedure must build on such a definition while also contending
with parameters iv) – viii). Several related considerations would seem to diminish even
further the prospects of defining a notion of canonicity for arithmetical definitions of
completions of T in a manner which would allow us to non-stipulatively determine the
truth values of sentences like    :
1) Let   = {' | N |=  (p'q)} be the set of sentences defined by  (x) relative to the
standard model. By definition,   ◆ T and is consistent (as long as T is). But since
 (x) is an arithmetical sentence, we cannot have   = TA (i.e. True Arithmetic) in
light of Tarski’s Theorem. Hence any candidate for  (x) must incorrectly decides
some arithmetical sentence.
2) The sequence of definitions given in §3.3 gives rise to a definition of  (x) which is 02.
But in fact this establishes neither an upper nor a lower bound on the complexity
of formulas which can define Henkin-complete extensions of T. For on the one hand,
Putnam (1965) showed that it is possible to find such a definition in the class ⌃⇤1
consisting of truth functional combinations of ⌃01-formulas.
63 And on the other, as
long as T is a sound theory it is also possible to increase the complexity of  (x) by
modifying parameter vii) (i.e. the extension condition) so that all sentences which
are added to   fall under the partial truth predicate Tr⌃k+1(x) (which provably
cannot be defined by a ⇧0k-formula).
3) The property HcmT(x) which holds of the code of a formula just in case it defines
a Henkin-complete extension of T is itself arithmetically definable. But it is easy
to see that even if we restrict attention to  02-completions, the problem of deciding
HcmT(x) is ⇧
0
2-complete and thus undecidable.
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4) Building on Proposition 5.2, it is also possible to define  (x) so that    is not only
independent of T but such that T +   and T + ¬  are both interpretable in T —
i.e. so that    is an Orey sentence for T.65
These observations would appear to rule out a number of otherwise plausible means
of imposing conditions on a “canonical” definition of  (x) so as to determine the truth
value of    .
66 This in turn suggests that sentences like    do not fall naturally into any
of Kreisel’s three categories of undecidable statements. For in regard to the first, note
that sentences like    are clearly metamathematical in character — e.g. in virtue of their
explicit reliance on an arithmetization of syntax. But such sentences are neither ⇧01 nor
are they defined such that the metatheoretic property which they express is clearly true
or false on the intended interpretation of either T or its metatheory.
63 Putnam (1957) had previously shown that this cannot be improved to ⌃01 [ ⇧01.
A contemporary refinement of the positive result is the so-called Low Arithmetized
Completeness Theorem (Ha´jek & Pudla´k, 1998, §I.4b) which provides a more precise
syntactic classification in terms of the class ⌃⇤0(⌃1).
64 Note on the one hand that the conditions expressing that '(x) defines a Henkin-
complete extension of T are ⇧01 in the definition of '(x). On the other, it is easy
to see that there is a reduction from the canonical ⇧02-complete set TOT of indices of
total recursive functions to Hcm(x).
65 This fact is mentioned in passing and without proof by Visser (1998, p. 323). One way
in which it can be shown is by modifying parameter iii) — i.e. the formalization of
provability – in the style of Feferman (1960) and then invoking the Orey-Gauspari-
Lindstro¨m Theorem (see Lindstro¨m, 1997, p. 81).The relevant techniques and several
generalizations will be developed in a sequel to this paper.
66 For instance in light of 1) and 2), there appears to be no principled means of restricting
attention to a particular formula class in attempting to define a completion which
better approximates TA. And in light of 3), we cannot even uniformly decide which
arithmetical formulas we should consider for performing this task.
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In regard to Kreisel’s second category, note that however  (x) is defined,    will be
provably equivalent to a first-order arithmetical statement. It is thus unlike the Continuum
Hypothesis in not admitting a higher-order formulation whose truth value can be a↵ected
by the external interpretation of the second-order quantifiers. But at the same time, there
are also choices of  (x) for which    will share an important a nity with CH which, it
will be recalled, is an Orey sentence for ZFC. And thus if  (x) is chosen per 4) so that   
is also an Orey sentence for T, then it will be like CH in the sense that the adjunction
of either it or its negation to T yields an extension which does not increase consistency
strength.
In regard to Kreisel’s third category, the received view to which he appears to be reacting
in (1967) holds that the choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries — and
thus the truth or falsity of the Parallel Postulate — is conventional. On the other hand,
   is an arithmetical formula and the received view here holds that arithmetic is unlike
geometry in having a determinant subject matter. Proponents of this position will thus
hold that once  (x) is fixed,    will have a determinate truth value in N . On this basis
it might initially seem far fetched to think that the choice between    and ¬   could in
any sense be conventional.67
But to reach such a conclusion summarily would be to overlook the origin of    and
the other undecidable statements which we have been considering. For since  (x) defines
a Henkin-complete extension of T, we have seen that it may be understood semantically
as defining a model M |= T from the standpoint of the standard model N |= T+Con(T)
which, on the received view, is the intended interpretation of T. Since    is derived by
diagonalizing  (x), it also seems reasonable to maintain that the description of such a
model contributes to its meaning. But as we have seen, not only must any model defined
in this way be nonstandard, Proposition 5.2 also demonstrates that we have considerable
flexibility in constructing M — inclusive of controlling whether it satisfies    itself. Thus
absent principled criteria by which we may rule out various candidate definitions of  (x), it
would seem that the truth value of the corresponding sentences    is indeed conventional to
at least the extent that the choice between di↵erent arithmetically definable nonstandard
models of T is.68
5.5. Comparison with axiomatic theories of truth A satisfactory assess-
ment of Kreisel and Wang’s approach described at the beginning of this section would
also need to further integrate the foregoing observations about undecidable statements
obtained in §4 with an account of the relationship which they bear to the paradoxes which
67 For instance Koellner (2009) appears to suggest that being an Orey sentence for ZFC is
a necessary but not su cient condition for regarding the truth value of a set theoretical
statement as one of “mere expedience”. On the other hand, he rules out the possibility
that arithmetical Orey sentences have this status by fiat.
68 An analogous sequence of observations will be true for the other undecidable statements
constructed in §4. For note that the only features of the sentence    on which
Proposition 5.2 depends are that it is undecidable in T and that it may be constructed
e↵ectively from the definition of  (x). A version of this result will thus be true, e.g.,
for the Kreisel sentence k 2 K constructed in the proof of Proposition 4.3. But now
suppose that we take M |= S + Con(S) to be the intended model of S. Then it will
be possible to define predicates  0(x) and  1(x) defining Henkin-complete extensions
of S such that the sentences k0 2 K0 and k1 2 K1 obtained from the corresponding
interpretations (·)0 and (·)1 in the manner of Proposition 4.3 are respectively false and
true in M. But via a series of observations analogous to those recorded in §3.3, it is
easy to see that  0(x) and  1(x) will both define !-nonstandard extensions of M. It
would thus again appear that we are free to choose between them — and also the truth
value of the relevant instantiation of the Kreisel sentence — without contravening our
conviction that M is the intended model of S.
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are used to generate them. We have already seen in §5.1 that one potential view is that
these statements should be regarded as the images of the paradoxical ones under Hilbert
& Bernays’s method of arithmetization. And thus at least from the perspective of their
finiten Standpunkt, it is not unreasonable to think that the paradoxes are indeed dissolved
in virtue of the relevant undecidability results.
A further comparison can also be framed between Hilbert & Bernays’s approach to
the semantic paradoxes and that provided by contemporary axiomatic theories of truth.
Theories of this sort are typically put forth in an attempt to formalize portions of our
reasoning about the “everyday” notion of truth or truth simpliciter as it is sometimes
called — i.e. truth in some fixed intended interpretation rather than in an arbitrary
model.69 As such, an axiomatic theory of truth is typically formed by adjoining to PA
axioms or rules involving a primitive predicate T(x) intended to express this notion.
Examples of such LT = LZ [ {T(x)} theories include PAT, CT, FS, and KF, familiarity
with which will be assumed in the sequel.70
The properties of T(x) which are axiomatized by these theories may be contrasted with
those which hold for the various defined notions of truth we have been considering. Of
these, it seems reasonable to take as basic the L2Z truth definition Tr(x) introduced in
§4.3.1. As we have seen, this definition essentially involves impredicative second-order
quantification. Hilbert & Bernays thus possessed a natural motivation to interpret Tr(x)
via the method of arithmetization. This may in turn may be achieved by applying the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to obtain a mapping (·)⇤ : L2Z ! LZ which is an
interpretation of a theory such as ACA0 in which it is possible to develop the properties
of Tr(x) relative to a first-order theory such as PA+Con(ACA0).
One axis along which it is possible to compare the properties of these formulas with
those of a primitive truth predicate T(x) is with respect to the status of the resulting
Liar-like sentences. Recall that the sentences  Tr and  Tr⇤ are respectively provable and
undecidable over ACA0. To assess the status of the analogous sentence for T(x) let  T be
 T =df ¬T(subst(l, l)) where l = pT(subst(x, x))q. This will be a  00-formula of LT if we
assume that the substitution function is in the language. But although in this case we
have PAT `  T $ ¬T(p Tq), it is a consequence of well-known results that the status of  T
depends on the truth-theoretic axioms which are adopted.
Proposition 5.3 i)  T is derivable in any theory extending PAT which includes the
axiom 8x(T(x) ! SentLZ(x)) asserting that only arithmetical sentences fall under T(x)
; ii)  T is also derivable in KF presuming that this theory is understood to include the
consistency axiom Cons (i.e. 8x(SentLT(x) ! ¬(T(x) ^ T(¬˙x)))) ; iii)  T is undecidable
in FS presuming that FS is consistent.
Although the axiom 8x(T(x) ! SentLZ(x)) is not typically included in any of the
theories mentioned above, it may be naturally adjoined to theories such as CT which are
intended to axiomatize a typed notion of truth in the sense that their axioms do not imply
that T(x) holds of any statements which contain this predicate itself. As such, part i) of
Proposition 5.3 reflects that if we took the additional step of asserting that T(x) cannot
hold of such statements, then we would be able to prove ¬Tr(p Tq) — and hence also  T
— in virtue of the fact that  T is an LT-sentence which is not an LZ-sentence. This can
be compared to the fact that  Tr is provable in ACA0 in virtue of the fact that it is an
L2Z-sentence which is also not an LZ-sentence.
On the other hand, no such restriction is imposed by the untyped theories FS and KF,
both of which contain principles which imply that T(x) holds of sentences containing this
predicate. In this setting the undecidability of  T is sometimes presented as a positive
69 See, e.g., (Dummett, 1978, p. 123), (Field, 2008, §1), and (Cies´lin´ski, 2018, §2).
70 For axiomatizations and accounts of the results assumed below see (Halbach, 2011).
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feature of FS as it is taken to accord with the intuition that the Liar sentence obtained
from a predicate formalizing the “everyday” notion of truth does not have a determinate
truth value.71 On the other hand, the derivability of  Tr – and thus also ¬T(p Trq) – has
been presented as evidence that KF is not a “natural” or “intuitively plausible” theory of
truth.72
We have seen that an interpretation (·)⇤ : L2Z ! LZ may be understood as a type-
lowering operator in the sense that the image of an L2Z-sentence under (·)⇤ is an LZ-
sentence. From this it follows that Tr⇤(p'q) will not always be refutable in ACA0 in
instances in which ' contains the formula Tr⇤(x) itself. For instance, we have seen that if
PA ` ', then PA ` Tr⇤(pTr⇤(p'q)q) and we have also seen that  Tr⇤ is undecidable even
in ACA0 (presuming that ACA0 +Con(ACA0) is consistent).
The latter result is analogous to the undecidability of  T in FS in that both results can
be obtained by noting that Tr⇤(x) and T(x) both satisfy necessitation and consistency-
cum-completeness conditions similar to (5.6a,b). But since T(x) is a primitive predicate,
it seems that Proposition 5.3iii) does little more than rea rm a brute intuition about
the status of the Liar.73 On the other hand, the considerations adduced in §5.4 suggest
an explanation of why it is reasonable to regard  Tr⇤ as indeterminate in truth value in
virtue of the intensional exigencies which must be confronted to define a predicate which
provably satisfies these properties.
These considerations suggest that it may be of independent interest to explore the
use of arithmetically definable predicates such as Tr⇤(x) to obtain models of various
axiomatic theories of truth. If we take to heart Hilbert & Bernays’s admonishments about
the foundational significance of the truth predicate (1939, pp. 338-339/351-353), we should
presumably view truth-theoretic reasoning as subsumed by a portion of mathematics
whose consistency must be accounted for by other means.74 The natural targets in this
regard thus become theories such as CT  and FS  — i.e. the typed compositional and
Friedman-Sheard theories with induction restricted to LZ — which are conservative over
PA.
One feature which is often cited in favor of these systems is that they validate a
disquotational characterization of truth in that they prove the T-biconditionals for all LZ-
sentences. On the other hand, since PA+Con(ACA0) ` '⇤ $  (p'q) for all L2Z-sentences,
it additionally follows from the provability of the T-biconditionals (4.16) in ACA0 that
(5.8) PA+Con(ACA0) ` '⇤ $ Tr⇤(p'q)
for all LZ-sentences '. This illustrates a sense in which the arithmetical predicate Tr⇤(x)
also satisfies something akin to a disquotation scheme. For supposeM |= ACA0 is strongly
defined by (·)⇤ relative to the standard model N in the manner of Theorem 3.4. As the
way in which the non-logical symbols of ' are interpreted in M mirror the substitution
of arithmetical formulas induced by (·)⇤, (5.8) illustrates how Tr⇤(x) may be viewed as a
definition of truth for M. In particular, we have that for all LZ-sentences '
(5.9) N |= Tr⇤(p'q) if and only if M |= '
71 On this point see (Kripke, 1975, p. 707, pp. 714-715), (Reinhardt, 1986, p. 238), (McGee,
1990, p. 14), (Feferman, 1991, p. 41).
72 See, e.g., (Halbach & Horsten, 2006, p. 682). This paper also presents a “partial” version
of KF without Cons in which the undecidability of  T is restored.
73 See, e.g., (Horsten, 2011, p. 112).
74 It would be anachronistic to try to locate the views of either Hilbert or Bernays with
respect to the latter day debate about deflationism. But it may still be noted that in
(1939, §5.2e) they appear to disavow the instrumental use of truth-theoretic reasoning
in consistency proofs of the sort considered by Reinhardt (1986) or Feferman (1991).
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As we have seen in §4.1, the first-order part of any modelM which has been constructed
in this manner will be a non-elementary end extension of N – e.g. we know in virtue of
Proposition 4.5 that these models must di↵er in the truth value they assign to  Tr⇤ . On the
other hand, we have also seen in §5.4 that there is no evident way of using general principles
about truth — e.g. of the sort underlying the inductive argument considered in §5.1 —
to decide the truth of such sentences. And thus since M presumably satisfies all of the
statements in which we might have a prior mathematical interest, the fact that it extends
N non-elementarily for some sentences which can be contrived metamathematically need
not be taken to tell against the potential use of Tr⇤(x) to explain various other aspects of
our reasoning about truth.
Note, for instance, that since the Tarskian compositional clauses for Tr(x) are provable
in ACA0, we additionally have (e.g.) PA + Con(ACA0) ` ¬'⇤ $ Tr⇤(p¬'q) and similarly
for the clauses for the other connectives. Since (·)⇤ is an interpretation rather than a
predicate, this can only be asserted schematically. But as we have seen in §3.3, the formula
 (x) will provably satisfy uniform analogs of the Tarskian compositional clauses in virtue
of (3.7c,d,e). This can be used to show that Tr⇤(x) and  (x) define coextensive notions
of truth for arithmetical sentences in the sense that ACA0 ` 8x(SentLZ(x) ! (Tr⇤(x) $
 (x))).75 Combining these facts allows us to show that over PA+Con(ACA0) we can derive
uniform versions of the compositional clauses such as
(5.10) 8x(SentLZ(x)! (Tr⇤(¬˙x)$ ¬Tr⇤(x)))
and thus also PA+Con(ACA0) ` 8x(SentLZ(x)! (Tr⇤(¬˙x) _ Tr⇤(x))).
This appears to show that by employing Tr⇤(x), we are able to satisfy the condi-
tion discussed in §5.1 which Tarski ultimately imposed on an adequate theory of truth.
However, a caveat is again necessary in virtue of the fact that Tr⇤(x) defines truth
in M rather than in N . A consequence is that the truth of (5.10) in N only entails
that negation commutes with Tr⇤(x) for standard length LZ-sentences rather than those
which fall under the interpretation of SentLZ(x) in M (which, by a familiar overspill
argument, will contain the codes of statements of nonstandard length). More generally,
if the Henkin construction described by  (x) is carried out in an arbitrary model of
M1 |= PA+Con(ACA0) to construct an end extension M2 |= ACA0, there is no guarantee
that {a 2 |M1| :M1 |= Tr⇤(a)} will be a full satisfaction class for the reduct of M2 to LZ
when defined from within M2. For unless additional conditions are imposed on  (x), if
M2 is constructed over the standard model, then its reduct to LZ need not be recursively
saturated. And in this case it will not admit a satisfaction class by the well-known theorem
of Lachlan (1981).
It is, however, possible to use the techniques we have been considering to ensure that
a model constructed by the formalized Henkin procedure is recursively saturated. One
means of doing this is to take advantage of the following fact:76
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that M1 |= PA is nonstandard and M2 is strongly definable
in M1. Then M2 is recursively saturated.
As we have seen, if M2 |= PA is strongly defined in M1 |= PA + Con(PA) by a formula
 (x) defining a Henkin-completion, then M2 must be nonstandard. Since Con(PA) is
undecidable in PA, it is possible to define  (x) so that M2 |= Con(PA) — e.g. by placing
Con(PA) first in the enumeration on which the definition of  (x) is based as discussed
in §5.4. In this case, the construction described by  (x) can again be carried out in M2
75 Since Tr⇤(x) is an LZ-formula, this may be shown by an internal induction on the
complexity of formulas in ACA0 making use of the fact that both this predicate and
 (x) satisfy the compositional clauses.
76 See, e.g., (Smorynski, 1984, §6).
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yielding a model M3 |= PA which must be recursively saturated by Proposition 5.4. But
now note that the iterated procedure is already describable from the perspective of M1
by considering the formula  2(x) =  (p (x˙))q).
It is a consequence of another well-known theorem of Kotlarski, Krajewski, & Lachlan
(1981) that any countable recursively saturated model M |= PA admits a satisfaction
class S ✓ |M|. From this it follows that hM, Si will be a model of CT . Three questions
which arise naturally at this stage but which will have to await other occasions are
as follows: 1) Can the definition of such a satisfaction class be formalized in PA (or a
weaker theory) by generalizing the techniques of §3.3? 2) If so, can the iteration of this
method be formalized to obtain a definition of a type-free satisfaction class77 which would
provide an interpretation of FS  in PA? 3) How would such constructions interact with
the other intensional parameters which have been suggested in §5.4 to be intrinsic to the
arithmetization of the completeness theorem?78
§6. Conclusion The goal of this paper has been to o↵er a systematic reconstruction
and generalization of a method for transforming paradoxes into formal incompleteness
results originally due to Kreisel and Wang, building on work of Hilbert and Bernays.
The following is a summary of the historical points which I have sought to highlight and
synthesize:
1) Hilbert & Bernays’s presentation of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems in the second
volume of the Grundlagen der Mathematik (1939) was not isolated from the other
aspects of their development of the finitary standpoint. Rather they refine and
elaborate on prior discussions of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, their
development of second-order logic, and their appreciation of the diagonal method
— e.g. in (Hilbert, 1917), (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928), and (Hilbert & Bernays,
1934, §7). On this basis, they also made substantial advances to the formalization of
semantic concepts leading to their formal truth definition for first-order arithmetic
presented in (1939, §5.2e).
2) Bernays appreciated the relationship between these developments and Go¨del’s (1930)
proof of the completeness theorem for first-order logic, which itself was grounded
in concepts and methods presented in these prior sources. In particular, he realized
Go¨del’s proof could be formalized in an arithmetical language, which in turn led to
his formulation of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem in (1939, §4.2).
3) This result can also be understood as a mathematical embodiment of what Hilbert &
Bernays refer to as the method of arithmetization (1934, pp. 1-3, 18-19) which they
(and others in the Go¨ttingen school) had sought to employ in consistency proofs for
77 See (Halbach, 2011, §14.1).
78 A positive answer to question 1) is stated by Enayat & Visser (2015, §16.5) on the basis
of their method for constructing full satisfaction classes which avoids the techniques
of M -logic originally employed by Kotlarski, Krajewski, & Lachlan (1981). In fact
by using either a formalized version of this construction or the arithmetization of the
conservativity proof for CT  via the corrected cut elimination argument of Leigh (2015),
it is in principle possible to obtain an interpretation of CT  in PA (as was originally
observed by Fischer, 2009). The full details of the relevant techniques have not yet
been published. But it may still be noted in regard to question 3) that they all rely on
variants of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem — e.g. in order to formalize the
compactness and elementary chain arguments of (Enayat & Visser, 2015) or to obtain
an interpretation on the basis of the conservativity of CT  via the Orey Compactness
Theorem (see, e.g., Lindstro¨m, 1997, p. 80).
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instances of “formal axiomatics” since the 1890s. This included axiomatizations not
only of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, but also of mathematical physics,
analysis, and set theory which Hilbert & Bernays speak of as “transcend[ing] the
realm of experience and intuitive self-evidence” (1934, p. 3/3).
4) Kreisel (1950, 1953) described a means of combining Bernays’s formalization of
Go¨del’s completeness theorem and his incompleteness theorems by applying the
former to an axiomatic system S of sets and classes similar to Go¨del-Bernays set
theory. In this way he showed that it is possible to formulate a sentence  akin to the
statement that the Russell class is not a member of itself. Although  is refutable
in S, Kreisel showed that its image ⇤ under an interpretation derived from the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem is formally undecidable in S (provided that
S+Con(S) is consistent). Kreisel’s method was later presented in a more accessible
form byWang (1955). Wang also generalized Kreisel’s treatment of Russell’s paradox
to the semantic paradoxes by showing how Hilbert & Bernays’s truth definition can
be used to produce a Liar-like sentence whose image under (·)⇤ is also formally
undecidable.
Wang’s result is in turn similar to Bernays’s original explanation of how arithmetical
formalization transforms the Liar paradox into a non-derivability result (1939, §5.2c). As
Bernays notes, this renders the system F in which Hilbert & Bernays carried out their
formalization incomplete rather than inconsistent. The incompleteness theorems have,
of course, persistently been regarded as undermining the goal of the Hilbert program
understood as that of o↵ering a finitary consistency proof for infinitary mathematics in
which Hilbert and his collaborators had hoped to formalize analysis (and of which systems
like GB and ACA0 are natural exemplars). But it is also notable that Bernays appears
to have come to view the results in question as playing a salutary role in his mature
understanding of the program. For not only did he suggest that the reception of the
incompleteness theorems within proof theory has led to other “constructive” techniques
for proving consistency (e.g. Bernays, 1954b, pp. 10-11), he went to considerable lengths
to illustrate how the method of arithmetization itself leads to such a proof for a fragment
of his own axiomatization of set theory (Bernays, 1954a, §19). For as we have seen, such a
construction can be understood as showing that even if we work over a language which is
su ciently expressive to formulate the relevant “paradoxical notions”, the corresponding
“paradoxical statements” do not give rise to contradictions but are rather transformed
into undecidable ones.
The events just summarized have their origins within the foundational developments
of the 1900s–1930s which have been widely scrutinized by philosophers of mathematics.
Nonetheless, the methods and results just described have received little notice outside
the developments within mathematical logic to which they directly contributed (on which
see Dean, 2017 and Dean & Walsh, 2017). Two apparent reasons for this are as fol-
lows. First, despite its classical origins, the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem remains
largely unknown to philosophers. Second, Kreisel and Wang’s methodological reflections
notwithstanding, the possibility that formal incompleteness might contribute to a uniform
resolution to the paradoxes (rather than merely being a byproduct of them) has been
largely overlooked within latter day work in philosophical logic. I will conclude by o↵ering
a brief comment on the prospects for further developments in each of these regards.
As I have attempted to illustrate in §3 and §4, the methods employed in the proof
of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem are both general in scope and flexible with
respect to the sorts of interpretations they can be used to construct. In particular, while
Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 are traditionally presented as applying to first-order theories, it
is striking that Kreisel and Wang’s original application of these results was to a theory
similar to one which is now often described as second-order — i.e. Go¨del-Bernays set
theory. As we have seen, there is no tension here because it is possible to regard both
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GB and similar L2Z-theories such as ACA0 as two-sorted first-order systems. But as we are
now in a better position to appreciate, when we apply Theorem 3.2 to such a theory to
yield an interpretation 2⇤ of the symbol 2 in the language of first-order arithmetic, we are
explicitly treating membership as a non-logical relation whose extension we can control
in the manner illustrated by results like Proposition 5.2. This in turn highlights in vivid
terms what is at issue in applying the method of arithmetization to theories su cient for
the development of analysis or set theory.79
In §5 I have attempted to lay out some of the philosophical exigencies which Wang’s
second alternative — i.e. that of “admitting paradoxical classes” but “treating as unde-
cided” questions about membership in them – would presumably have to face were it
to be developed systematically. And although I have not articulated an explicit thesis
about the resolution of the paradoxes here, we are now also in an improved position to
appreciate two potentially attractive features of such an approach. First, we have seen
how Wang’s proposal grows naturally out of considerations which have their origin in
Hilbert & Bernays’s finitary standpoint. This in turn suggests that it may be useful to
adopt such a perspective in our approach to the paradoxes — e.g. to provide a set of
foundational and methodological desiderata against which to compare proposals of the sort
which is often lacking in contemporary philosophical theorizing. Second, I have suggested
in §5 that the resulting developments can be understood as providing at least a technical
explanation of why the resulting formalized versions of paradoxical statements are formally
undecidable — a feature which has been repeatedly advertised as a virtue of various
axiomatic approaches to the semantic paradoxes.80 As I have suggested, however, the
ultimate evaluation of Wang’s proposal must await a more thorough account of the sort of
incompleteness which is at issue – e.g. Is the basis for the undecidability of the statements
constructed in §4 best understood in semantic, epistemic, or conventional terms? How do
the various dimensions of intensionality discussed in §5 bear on this?
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